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 In recent years there has been a remark-
able convergence across several common law ju-
risdictions regarding the need to recognize some 
form of a tort of invasion of privacy, particularly 
with respect to the publication of private facts. 
Despite this convergence, the author argues 
that there remains a palpable “containment 
anxiety” at play in the jurisprudence that is re-
sponsible for a number of recurring tensions re-
garding the scope of protection.  
 Instead of focusing on the question of how 
to define privacy, this paper frames the con-
tainment anxiety at issue in the cases in terms 
of a justificatory dilemma rather than a defini-
tional one. Using the work of Mill and Kant, the 
author argues that if we understand privacy 
rights as protecting either the value of auton-
omy or freedom from harm then we can justify a 
narrow legal right to privacy. Although this can 
explain the containment anxiety in the juris-
prudence, it severely undermines the growing 
recognition of the importance of privacy. There-
fore this paper proposes an alternative justifica-
tion for privacy rights that is rooted in the value 
of protecting identity interests, where identity 
is understood in terms of one's capacity for self-
presentation.  
 
On assiste depuis quelques années à une 
convergence remarquable à travers plusieurs ju-
ridictions de common law quant au besoin de re-
connaître une forme de délit d’atteinte à la vie 
privée, plus particulièrement en ce qui a trait à la 
publication de faits privés. Malgré cette conver-
gence, l’auteur maintient qu’il existe toujours un 
certain « malaise » quant aux limites à imposer 
aux mesures de protection. Ce malaise, qui se fait 
sentir dans la jurisprudence, est responsable de 
certaines tensions récurrentes quant à l’étendue 
de la protection à accorder à la vie privée.  
 Plutôt que de se concentrer sur une définition 
de la vie privée, cet article présente le malaise 
dont il est question dans les arrêts en termes d’un 
dilemme de justification plutôt que de définition. 
En se basant sur les travaux de Mill et de Kant, 
l’auteur fait valoir que si nous entendons le droit à 
la vie privée comme protégeant soit l’autonomie, 
soit l’exemption du mal, il est alors possible de jus-
tifier un droit étroit à la vie privée. Si cette ap-
proche peut expliquer le malaise ressenti dans la 
jurisprudence, elle mine sévèrement l’importance 
croissante qui est accordée à la vie privée. Cet es-
sai propose donc une justification alternative du 
droit à la vie privée qui se fonde sur l’importance 
de protéger les intérêts identitaires, où l’identité 
est conçue en termes de la capacité 
d’autoreprésentation d’une personne.  
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 It is rare for the tabloids to produce anything of interest to legal theo-
rists. And yet it seems to be the fate of privacy law that many significant 
developments have been motivated by the prurient practices of celebrity 
gossip journalism. For example, in 2004 the House of Lords ruled that 
Naomi Campbell could recover damages for breach of confidentiality on 
account that her privacy had been violated by a British tabloid for detail-
ing her alleged drug treatment, accompanied by a photograph of her pur-
portedly leaving a Narcotics Anonymous meeting. The headline read: 
“Naomi: I am a drug addict.”1 In the same year the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal ruled that it was willing to recognize an independent tort of publi-
cation of private facts, even though it would not extend its protection to 
the children of celebrity couple Mr. and Mrs. Hosking who were photo-
graphed while being pushed in a stroller by their mother.2  
 These cases recall Samuel Warren and Lewis Brandeis’s concern re-
garding the practices of yellow journalism and their claim, in 1890, that  
[i]nstantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have in-
vaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numer-
ous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that 
“what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-
tops.”3  
The remedy, they argued, was for judges to recognize a common law right 
to privacy, a right that American courts have subsequently protected 
through the law of torts.4 This paper argues, however, that even if tabloid 
journalism has inadvertently forged a consensus regarding the need to re-
spect privacy, it is still not clear whether, in what manner, and to what 
extent private law should be enlisted in this endeavour. One of the diffi-
culties regarding private law protection for privacy is that this emerging 
consensus regarding the need for legal protection is nonetheless fragile 
and masks deep tensions. As I argue in this paper, while there is a clear 
“privacy impulse” emerging across several common law jurisdictions, 
                                                  
1   Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457 at para. 2, [2004], 2 W.L.R. 
1232 [Campbell]. 
2   See Hosking v. Runting, [2004] NZCA 34, [2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 1 [Hosking]. The children 
were conceived through IVF treatment and the Hoskings had been open with the press 
about Mrs. Hosking’s pregnancy. After the twins were born, they declined further inter-
views or photographs. 
3   Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy” (1890) 4 Harv. L. Rev.193 at 
195. 
4   While often cited for the view that privacy is “the right to be let alone,” this in fact is not 
a good interpretation of their argument. See Ruth Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of 
Law” (1980) 89 Yale L.J. 421 at 437, n. 48. 
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there is also a “containment anxiety” at play in the case law whereby 
judges seek to contain the legal protection for privacy. This containment 
anxiety takes different forms and is responsible for the tensions and dif-
ferences now evident in private law protection for privacy. 
 There are different ways to understand this containment anxiety. The 
simplest explanation is that it is motivated by the definitional difficulties 
surrounding privacy; as has been well catalogued in the literature, there 
is little consensus regarding what privacy is and when it has been vio-
lated.5 However, while the definitional dilemma might be a familiar start-
ing point for privacy theorists, this paper adopts a different approach. I 
argue that the containment anxiety at issue is better explained in terms 
of a justificatory dilemma rather than a definitional one.  
 All legal rights raise the question of scope, and this question is inti-
mately linked to issues of value and justification: what values underlie 
the right claimed, and how do these values connect to justifications for le-
gal liability? Traditional liberal strategies for justifying private law rights 
focus on either autonomy or harm. Using Mill, I analyze what privacy un-
derstood as insulation from harm looks like and using Kant, I analyze 
what privacy understood as the protection of autonomy looks like. My ar-
gument is that if we understand privacy as protecting either the value of 
autonomy or freedom from harm, then we can justify only a fairly narrow 
legal right to privacy. Although this can provide a reasonably precise ex-
planation for the specific ways in which courts have sought to limit the 
scope of privacy claims, it severely undermines the growing recognition of 
the importance of privacy. Therefore, instead of delineating a narrow pri-
vacy right, I argue that this focus on justification shows that privacy is in 
fact not well described at all in terms of either harm or autonomy, and 
that a legal right based on either of these justifications will be unduly nar-
row.  
 The alternative account that I put forward at the end of this paper is 
that we should view privacy as protecting one’s identity. Indeed, identity 
is a value upon which a number of privacy theorists are converging, al-
though academic work on the relationship between privacy and identity is 
more prominent outside legal scholarship.6 I invoke identity in order to 
                                                  
5   See e.g. ibid.; Daniel J. Solove, “A Taxonomy of Privacy” (2006) 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477; 
Judith Jarvis Thomson, “The Right to Privacy” in Ferdinand David Schoeman, ed., Phi-
losophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984) 272. 
6   See e.g. Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Garden City, N.J.: 
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959). Roger A. Clarke has also influenced a number of peo-
ple in the field of data protection with his notion of the “digital persona”: Roger A. 
Clarke, “Information Technology and Dataveillance” in Charles Dunlop & Rob Kling, 
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argue that privacy protects one’s capacity for identity formation. This can 
provide both an account of the privacy interests at stake in cases like 
Campbell and Hosking, as well as a justification for a more robust privacy 
right than that offered by an understanding of privacy rooted in either 
autonomy or harm. Attending to questions of justification in this way can 
therefore also help to illuminate the nature of what I have been calling 
the emerging privacy impulse in a manner that can help develop a more 
coherent jurisprudence.  
I. Unravelling the Tort Claim  
 Although their precise legal formulations vary, many of the major 
common law jurisdictions are beginning to converge on recognizing a pri-
vate law right to privacy. For example, while courts in the United States 
have recognized a tort of invasion of privacy since 1904,7 courts in New 
Zealand now also recognize this tort, at least as it applies to the publica-
tion of private facts,8 and courts in the United Kingdom have held that 
the law of confidentiality protects privacy in similar circumstances.9 Ca-
nadian courts have made numerous encouraging statements regarding 
common law protection for privacy, although most of these have arisen in 
very different contexts from the publication of private facts situation in 
both Campbell and Hosking.10 Canadian commentators have also called 
      
eds., Computerization and Controversy: Value Conflicts and Social Choices (San Diego: 
Academic Press, 1991) 496. 
7   See Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance, 69 L.R.A. 101, 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). Note 
that this would be considered to fall under the “false-light” branch of the American tort, 
and not publication of private facts. 
8   See Hosking, supra note 2. 
9   See Campbell, supra note 1. Before Campbell, the role of confidentiality in the protec-
tion of privacy was affirmed in Douglas v. Hello! Ltd. (2000), [2001] Q.B. 967, [2001] 2 
W.L.R. 992 (C.A. U.K.). 
10   See e.g. Motherwell v. Motherwell (1976), 1 A.R. 47, 73 D.L.R. (3d) 62 (C.A.) (arguably 
extending the law of nuisance to capture privacy interests); Roth v. Roth (1991), 4 O.R. 
(3d) 740, 9 C.C.L.T. (2d) 141 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (recognizing the possibility that invasion 
of privacy might be actionable in the context of harassment in the enjoyment of prop-
erty). More recently, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice has indicated a willingness 
to recognize a tort of invasion of privacy to deal with an employee credit check without 
consent. See Somwar v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada Ltd. (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 
172, 263 D.L.R. (4th) 752 (Sup. Ct.). A small claims court was also willing to recognize 
the tort. See Caltagirone v. Scozzair-Clutier, [2007] O.J. No. 4003 (Ont. Sup. Ct. (Sm. 
Cl. Div.)) (QL). The court has recognized the tort in the context of the publication of a 
private telephone conversation. See Saccione v. Orr (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 317, 19 C.C.L.T. 
37 (Co. Ct.). Several Canadian provinces have created a statutory tort that would cover 
the publication of private facts context. See Privacy Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. P-22 (New-
foundland); The Privacy Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. P125 (Manitoba); The Privacy Act, R.S.S. 
1978, c. P-24 (Saskatchewan); Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 336 (British Columbia). 
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for the general recognition of a tort of invasion of privacy.11 Finally, a 
number of lower-court decisions in Australia have also endorsed some 
version of the tort.12  
 For the purposes of comparison, this paper focuses on tort liability as-
sociated with the publication of private facts as it has developed in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand. Because other ju-
risdictions do not have similar leading decisions regarding the publication 
of private facts, I do not include a discussion of their developing privacy 
jurisprudence.13 I argue that this strong judicial privacy impulse—an in-
tuition that privacy is a fundamental value worthy of legal protection—is 
being undercut by a judicial containment anxiety. This anxiety pertains to 
the consequences of providing the legal protection that seems called for by 
that privacy impulse and is leading to a number of important areas of dis-
agreement and confusion in the case law. The following two sections out-
line in detail some of the inconsistencies and disagreements between ju-
risdictions as to the ambit of privacy rights in order to identify the key 
tensions and questions regarding private law protection for privacy. The 
first section reveals these tensions in the context of the question of 
whether to recognize a tort of invasion of privacy; the second section con-
siders the substance of the action. Subsequent sections of this paper argue 
that the precise contours of this containment anxiety are actually quite 
instructive in relation to our understanding of privacy and can be best 
understood in terms of a justificatory dilemma in relation to a private law 
right to privacy.  
A. Recognition of the Tort 
 This section outlines the differences between the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and New Zealand in relation to the issue of whether to 
      
Quebec recognizes a privacy right in art. 36 C.C.Q., and in the Quebec Charter of Hu-
man Rights and Freedoms (R.S.Q. c. C-12, s. 5 [Quebec Charter]). For an interesting 
Quebec Charter case dealing with the publication of private facts, see Aubry v. Éditions 
Vice-Versa, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 591, 157 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [Aubry]. The High Court of Austra-
lia has specifically left open the possibility of a tort of privacy. See Australian Broad-
casting Corp. v. Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd., [2001] HCA 63, 208 C.L.R. 199, 76 
A.L.J.R. 1 [Lenah].  
11   See John D.R. Craig, “Invasion of Privacy and Charter Values: The Common-Law Tort 
Awakens” (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 355. 
12   See Doe v. Australian Broadcasting Corp., [2007] VCC 281; Grosse v. Purvis, [2003] 
QDC 151, [2003] Aust Torts Reports 81-706. See also Lenah, supra note 10. Compare 
Giller v. Procopets, [2008] VSCA 236 (dealing with the publication of sexually explicit 
videotapes as a question of confidentiality rather than privacy). 
13   The most similar Canadian case is Aubry, which was decided on the basis of the Quebec 
Charter and not the common law (supra note 10).  
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recognize a tort of invasion of privacy. Courts in the United States have 
long recognized a tort of invasion of privacy. In a well-known 1960 article, 
William Prosser surveyed the jurisprudence that had emerged after War-
ren and Brandeis’s influential article, and classified the cases into four 
branches: publication of private facts, false-light advertising, misappro-
priation of name or likeness, and intrusions upon seclusion.14 Prosser ar-
gued that these four branches in fact protected very different interests—
including mental, reputational, and proprietary interests—and should be 
treated separately by the courts. His classification was subsequently 
adopted by the American Restatement of Torts and now forms the basis of 
American privacy jurisprudence.15  
 Prosser’s fracturing of the tort has also strongly influenced the devel-
opment of the law of privacy in other jurisdictions. Outside the United 
States, most jurisdictions have been unwilling to recognize what Lord 
Hoffman, in Wainwright, called a “high-level principle” of invasion of pri-
vacy justifying a general tort of invasion of privacy.16 Indeed, the difficul-
ties that U.S. courts have faced in delineating the content of the tort are a 
central reason for the hesitation on the part of the House of Lords to fol-
low the American example. For example, in Wainwright, Lord Hoffmann 
stated:  
 The need in the United States to break down the concept of “in-
vasion of privacy” into a number of loosely-linked torts must cast 
doubt upon the value of any high-level generalization which can per-
form a useful function in enabling one to deduce the rule to be ap-
plied in a concrete case. ... There are a number of common law and 
statutory remedies of which it may be said that one at least of the 
underlying values they project is a right of privacy. ... But there are 
gaps; cases in which the courts have considered that an invasion of 
privacy deserves a remedy which the existing law does not offer. 
Sometimes the perceived gap can be filled by judicious development 
of an existing principle. The law of breach of confidence has in recent 
years undergone such a process.17 
In the United Kingdom, therefore, privacy is protected by private law only 
insofar as courts can fashion discrete developments within existing legal 
categories.  
                                                  
14   See William L. Prosser, “Privacy” (1960) 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383. See also Warren & 
Brandeis, supra note 3.  
15   See American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts § 652D (1997) 
[Restatement 2d § 652D]. 
16   Wainwright v. Home Office, [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 A.C. 406 at para. 18, [2003] 3 
W.L.R. 1137 [Wainwright]. 
17   Ibid. [reference omitted]. 
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 This need to frame one’s claim within an existing cause of action has 
narrowed the scope of protection available to potential claimants. For ex-
ample, in Wainwright the House of Lords denied Mrs. Wainwright a rem-
edy for having been strip searched while visiting her son in prison, despite 
the court’s finding that the search was gratuitous and distressing. None-
theless, one year later the House of Lords was willing to grant Naomi 
Campbell a remedy for the Daily Mirror article and photos. Because Ms. 
Campbell had made public statements that she was not a drug addict, the 
House of Lords unanimously held that the newspaper was fully entitled to 
“put the record straight” by reporting that she was a drug addict and was 
receiving treatment.18 However, the House of Lords split on its assess-
ment of the facts of the case. Three of the five Law Lords held that the 
newspaper violated Ms. Campbell’s privacy when it further reported  
the fact that the treatment which she was receiving was provided by 
Narcotics Anonymous; ... details of the treatment—for how long, how 
frequently and at what times of day she had been receiving it, the 
nature of it and extent of her commitment to the process; and ... a 
visual portrayal by means of photographs of her when she was leav-
ing the place where treatment had been taking place.19  
The reason for the difference in treatment between Mrs. Wainwright and 
Ms. Campbell was that in Campbell the House of Lords could invoke the 
breach of confidence action to protect her privacy, instead of some “high-
level principle.”20 On its face this result seems anomalous in permitting 
serious violations of privacy while punishing much more minor ones, mak-
ing the broad sweep of the American tort appear preferable despite its 
many difficulties.  
 The New Zealand Court of Appeal explicitly disagreed with the House 
of Lords’s adaptation of the law of breach of confidence in order to protect 
privacy: 
Privacy and confidence are different concepts. To press every case 
calling for a remedy for unwarranted exposure of information about 
the private lives of individuals into a cause of action having as its 
foundation trust and confidence will be to confuse those concepts.21 
They were particularly concerned about the implications of such an ex-
pansion on more traditional areas of the law of confidentiality; however, 
the court also thought that confidentiality provided too limited a protec-
tion for privacy. For example, Peck v. United Kingdom highlighted for the 
                                                  
18   Campbell, supra note 1 at para. 24. 
19   Ibid. at para. 88. 
20   Wainwright, supra note 16 at para. 18. 
21   Hosking, supra note 2 at para. 48. 
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court the limitations of the law of confidence.22 In that case, the European 
Court of Human Rights held that the law of confidentiality could not plau-
sibly catch the broadcast of footage of an attempted suicide captured by a 
closed-circuit television camera in a public place, even though this broad-
cast was a violation of privacy. Because of these concerns, the New Zea-
land Court of Appeal rejected the House of Lords’s reliance upon confiden-
tiality and instead recognized a tort of invasion of privacy—at least as it 
applied to the publication of private facts. This rejection raises a certain 
irony, given the subsequent U.K. decision in Murray v. Express Newspa-
pers, where the Court of Appeal of England and Wales rejected the out-
come in the New Zealand decision of Hosking and, purporting to follow 
Campbell, affirmed that the child of a famous parent could have a privacy 
right to restrain the publication of photos taken of him in a public place.23 
 Despite this difference in terminology—and the substantive concerns 
underlying this difference—the New Zealand position follows that of the 
United Kingdom in not recognizing a general tort of invasion of privacy as 
is found in American jurisprudence. Perhaps this fact, and the overlap in 
concerns detailed below, led the New Zealand court to indicate that it be-
lieved its approach to be “very close” to that of the House of Lords.24  
 Like the House of Lords decision in Campbell, Hosking was a split de-
cision (three-to-two) with two strong dissents that reveal a number of fur-
ther tensions surrounding the recognition of the tort of invasion of pri-
vacy. Justice Keith wrote in dissent that no cause of action for the publi-
cation of private facts should exist in the common law of New Zealand. 
For him, the reasons for this included the perceived lack of need, given 
the fact that there were already specific protections in place—such as the 
law of confidentiality—as well as a concern for the effect of such a tort on 
freedom of expression.25 Justice Anderson agreed, holding that “this new 
liability, created in a side wind, is amorphous, unnecessary, a dispropor-
tionate response to rare, almost hypothetical circumstances and falls 
                                                  
22   Ibid. at para. 51, citing Peck v. United Kingdom, no. 44647/98, [2003] I E.C.H.R. 123, 36 
E.H.R.R. 41 [Peck]. 
23   Murray v. Express Newspapers plc, [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2008] 3 W.L.R. 1360 
[Murray]. The child in question was David Murray, the son of author J.K. Rowling. The 
court emphasized that the fact that the case dealt with the rights of the child and not 
the famous parent was crucial and that the law should protect children from intrusive 
media attention. Even though others on the street could see the child, the publication of 
the photo widened the audience considerably and could provide an incentive to further 
intrusive attention in the future (ibid. at para. 50). 
24   Hosking, supra note 2 at para. 7. 
25   See ibid. at para. 177. 
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manifestly short of justifying its limitation on the right to freedom of ex-
pression.”26 
 Ironically, this dissenting inclination not to recognize any tort of inva-
sion of privacy out of concern for freedom of expression is more in line 
with actual judicial practice in the United States where, as has been out-
lined, a much broader tort is recognized. A particularly striking example 
of privacy interests being overridden by freedom of expression is Florida 
Star v. B.J.F.27 In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States over-
turned a lower-court decision imposing damages on a newspaper for pub-
lishing the name of a rape victim. Despite the fact that such publication 
was in violation of a Florida statute, as well as the newspaper’s policy, the 
court ruled that damages would violate the First Amendment. As Justice 
White held in dissent, 
[a]t issue in this case is whether there is any information about peo-
ple, which—though true—may not be published in the press. By 
holding that only “a state interest of the highest order” permits the 
State to penalize the publication of truthful information, and by 
holding that protecting a rape victim’s right to privacy is not among 
those state interests of the highest order, the Court accepts the ap-
pellant’s invitation ... to obliterate one of the most noteworthy legal 
inventions of the 20th century: the tort of the publication of private 
facts. ... Even if the Court’s opinion does not say as much today, such 
obliteration will follow inevitably from the Court’s conclusion here. If 
the First Amendment prohibits wholly private persons (such as 
B.J.F.) from recovering for the publication of the fact that she was 
raped, I doubt that there remain any “private facts” which persons 
may assume will not be published in the newspapers or broadcast on 
television.28 
Justice White’s concern has been echoed by a number of commentators.29 
Therefore, the privacy tort in the United States covers a broader set of po-
                                                  
26   Ibid. at para. 271. 
27   491 U.S. 524 at 536, 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989) [Florida Star]. The decision was split 6-3. 
The court held that because the police report had inadvertently and erroneously named 
the victim, the newspaper reporter had not unlawfully obtained the information. It was 
up to the government (i.e., the police) to handle the information properly and to poten-
tially compensate victims for their loss of privacy (ibid. at 538).  
28   Ibid. at 550-51 [references omitted]. 
29   See e.g. Peter B. Edelman, “Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice 
Black” (1990) 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1195; Jacqueline R. Rolfs, “The Florida Star v. B.J.F.: The 
Beginning of the End for the Tort of Public Disclosure” (1990) Wis. L. Rev. 1107. For a 
discussion about the relationship between the tort of invasion of privacy and freedom of 
expression in the United States, see generally Diane L. Zimmerman, “Requiem for a 
Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort” (1983) 68 Cornell L. 
Rev. 291; C. Edwin Baker, “Autonomy and Informational Privacy, or Gossip: The Cen-
tral Meaning of the First Amendment” (2004) 21 Soc. Phil. & Pol’y 215. 
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tential privacy invasions than publication of private facts, including in-
trusions upon seclusion, false-light advertising, and the appropriation of 
name or likeness. However, when the focus is on publication of private 
facts, American common law in fact provides protection to a far narrower 
class of publications than other jurisdictions due to the pre-eminence 
given to freedom of expression. 
 Judicial reluctance to recognize a tort of invasion of privacy therefore 
remains strong and can be summarized through reference to a number of 
interrelated concerns that show judicial anxiety regarding the ability to 
contain legal liability arising out of privacy violations. There are concerns 
that privacy is too vague a concept upon which to create a general tort, 
and that freedom of expression is important and should not be easily lim-
ited by such vague concerns. Many of these anxieties also influence the 
scope of the tort once it is recognized: if the common law develops to pro-
tect privacy, it should do so by expanding upon existing causes of action or 
at least by proceeding incrementally, rather than by establishing a broad 
and general principle and by recognizing a robust countervailing interest 
in freedom of expression that limits liability. As the following section out-
lines, this containment anxiety is also present in disputes regarding the 
substantive elements of the action.  
B. Substance of the Action 
 Although the United States, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand 
all recognize some form of common law protection for the publication of 
private acts, there are important substantive differences between their 
approaches. This section outlines these differences as well as how they 
may be cast as variations of a judicial containment anxiety with respect to 
privacy. The first variation of this anxiety—found in both approaches of 
the United States and of New Zealand—involves limiting the scope of pri-
vacy through reference to a threshold of “offensiveness”.30 The second 
variation—found in the United Kingdom but with echoes of it in all juris-
dictions—is effectively to deny any difference between “private” and “con-
fidential” information.  
 As already mentioned, American courts recognize four different 
branches to the tort of invasion of privacy: publication of private facts, in-
trusions upon seclusion, false-light advertising, and the appropriation of 
name or likeness. In contrast, the New Zealand Court of Appeal has re-
stricted its recognition of the tort to the publication of private facts. While 
American courts have signalled an unwillingness to let privacy concerns 
outweigh freedom of expression, the New Zealand Court of Appeal has in-
                                                  
30   Infra notes 34, 35. 
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dicated that both values are worthy of protection and that one should not 
be subsumed by the other.31 Nonetheless, apart from these differences, the 
New Zealand tort of publication of private facts is quite similar to the 
“publicity given to private life” branch of the American tort of invasion of 
privacy.  
 The central point of agreement is that the publication of private facts 
is not enough to establish liability; this publicity must also be “highly of-
fensive”.32 According to Justices Gault and Blanchard, there are two re-
quirements for a successful claim of interference with privacy in New Zea-
land: 
1.  The existence of facts in respect of which there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy; and 
2. Publicity given to those private facts that would be considered 
highly offensive to an objective reasonable person.33 
This is very similar to the American position, which provides that: 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of an-
other is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if 
the matter publicized is of a kind that  
 (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and  
 (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.34  
The New Zealand Court of Appeal did not make absence of legitimate con-
cern an element of the tort, but rather held that a legitimate public con-
cern in the information was a defence to the tort. 
 The court in Hosking spoke explicitly of its reasons for requiring offen-
siveness as a means to contain liability. Justices Gault and Blanchard ar-
gued, 
 In theory, a rights-based cause of action would be made out by 
proof of breach of the right irrespective of the seriousness of the 
breach. However, it is quite unrealistic to contemplate legal liability 
for all publications of all private information. It would be absurd, for 
example, to consider actionable merely informing a neighbour that 
one’s spouse has a cold. By living in communities individuals neces-
sarily give up seclusion and expectations of complete privacy. The 
concern of the law, so far as we are presently concerned, is with 
widespread publicity of very personal and private matters. Publica-
tion in the technical sense, for example as applies in defamation, is 
not in issue. 
                                                  
31   See Florida Star, supra note 27; Hosking, supra note 2. 
32   Ibid. at para. 117. 
33   Ibid.  
34   Restatement 2d § 652D, supra note 15. 
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 Similarly publicity, even extensive publicity, of matters which, 
although private, are not really sensitive should not give rise to legal 
liability. The concern is with publicity that is truly humiliating and 
distressful or otherwise harmful to the individual concerned. The 
right of action, therefore, should be only in respect of publicity de-
termined objectively, by reference to its extent and nature, to be of-
fensive by causing real hurt or harm. ... 
 We consider that the test of highly offensive to the reasonable 
person is appropriate. It relates, of course, to the publicity and is not 
part of the test of whether the information is private. 
 We do not see personal injury or economic loss as necessary ele-
ments of the action. The harm to be protected against is in the na-
ture of humiliation and distress.35 
In this way, the court endeavoured to ask first, whether the information 
at issue was private, and second, whether it met a certain kind of thresh-
old of seriousness in order to engage legal protection. This second, thresh-
old question is separate from the issue of balancing privacy against other 
values such as freedom of expression, since the court also recognized a de-
fence of legitimate public concern, which can take into account freedom of 
expression.36 Rather, the threshold of seriousness is meant to identify the 
harm involved, which is understood in terms of “humiliation and dis-
tress.”37 
 Apart from requiring a threshold of seriousness, both the American 
and New Zealand versions of the tort require a prior determination that 
the information published be “private”. And this leads to a second strategy 
of containment, although it is usually not explicitly understood as such. In 
determining whether the published facts are indeed “private”, courts often 
revert to ideas of confidentiality. For example, in denying a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the photographs of the Hosking children, the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal ruled, 
The photographs ... do not disclose anything more than could have 
been observed by any member of the public in Newmarket on that 
particular day. They do not show where the children live, or disclose 
any information that might be useful to someone with ill intent. The 
existence of the twins, their age and the fact that their parents are 
separated are already matters of public record.38 
                                                  
35   Hosking, supra note 2 at paras. 125-28 [emphasis in original]. Tipping J. agreed that 
the question of offensiveness should be part of the test for reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, but held that it should be a “substantial” level of offence rather than a “high” level 
of offence (ibid. at para. 256). 
36   See ibid. at para. 129. 
37   Ibid. at para. 128. 
38   Ibid. at para. 164. 
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American courts would have likely come to the same conclusion.39 How-
ever, this idea that there can be no privacy interest in information that 
has already in some sense been revealed in public comes directly out of a 
paradigm of confidentiality.40 As will become clearer in the discussion of 
confidentiality in connection with the Campbell decision below, informa-
tion that is publicly available generally fails the test for confidentiality. 
However, even if this is quite a familiar conclusion regarding confidential-
ity, privacy-focused analysis can lead to a different result. Indeed, many 
commentators have indicated that there can be a privacy interest in “pub-
lic” information, and their view is also supported by some judicial opin-
ion.41 It is thus not clear why the court in Hosking felt the need to deny a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in public, when it could have invoked its 
test of offensiveness to achieve the same result. 
 The relationship between privacy and confidentiality is more explicitly 
addressed in Campbell, although many issues remain unresolved. Despite 
a three-to-two split, the House of Lords in Campbell understood itself to 
agree that the recognition of breach of confidentiality is a cause of action 
capable of protecting privacy, and to split instead on its application to the 
facts of the case. However, there was also significant disagreement re-
garding whether the court was simply applying the traditional breach of 
confidentiality action or creating a new, extended version of the action. 
Implicit in this disagreement are differing views regarding the relation-
ships between “confidential” and “private” information. A brief overview of 
the law of confidentiality is necessary to distinguish these concepts.  
                                                  
39   See e.g. Prosser, supra note 14 at 391-92 (there is no right of privacy in public places). 
40   See e.g. Jonathan Morgan, “Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect: ‘Hello’ Trouble” 
(2003) 62 Cambridge L.J. 444 (photographs of individuals in public places cannot be 
protected by the law of confidentiality). 
41   See e.g. Helen Nissenbaum “Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of 
Privacy in Public” (1998) 17 Law & Phil. 559; Lisa Austin, “Privacy and the Question of 
Technology” (2003) 22 Law & Phil. 119; N.A. Moreham, “Privacy in Public Places” 
(2006) 65 Cambridge L.J. 606. This has been recently recognized in the U.K. decision 
Murray (supra note 23) and by the European Court of Human Rights in Von Hannover 
v. Germany ((2004), 2004-VI E.C.H.R. (Ser. A) 41, 40 E.H.R.R. 1 [Von Hannover]). The 
Supreme Court of the United States recognized a privacy interest in a compilation of 
public records in Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. United States De-
partment of Justice (489 U.S. 749, 109 S. Ct. 1468 (1989)). Interpreting the Quebec 
Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized a privacy right attaching to one’s im-
age even where the photograph was taken in a public place in Aubry (supra note 10). 
The Canadian Judicial Council recognizes that broad electronic access to public court 
records raises a number of privacy concerns: Canadian Judicial Council, Model Policy 
for Access to Court Records in Canada, online: Canadian Institute for the Administra-
tion of Justice <http://www.ciaj-icaj.ca>.  
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 Breach of confidentiality was originally understood as an equitable 
doctrine.42 Until Saltman Engineering Coy. Ld. v. Campbell Engineering 
Coy., Ld.,43  
the main cases on [breach of] confidentiality [were seen to be] sig-
nificant for their lack of any uniform jurisprudential basis. The con-
fidences were mostly commercial and arose generally in the context 
of contracts, such as contracts of partnership, employment, agency 
or sale.44  
Saltman is significant in that it affirmed that there could be an obligation 
of confidence without a contractual relationship. Saltman also defined 
when the information at issue had the necessary quality of confidence 
about it. Lord Greene M.R. stated, “The information, to be confidential, 
must, I apprehend, apart from contract, have the necessary quality of con-
fidence about it, namely, it must not be something which is public property 
and public knowledge.”45 Confidential information therefore refers to the 
fact that the information is kept secret, rather than any quality intrinsic 
to the information itself. Notably, public information is by definition non-
confidential. 
 The classic statement of breach of confidence, now understood to stand 
independently of contract, is found in Coco v. A.N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd., 
where Justice Megarry, as he then was, identified three elements for a 
successful breach of confidence claim: 
First, the information ... must “have the necessary quality of confi-
dence about it.” Secondly, that information must have been imparted 
in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence. Thirdly, 
there must be an unauthorized use or disclosure of that information 
to the detriment of the party communicating it.46 
The second element has generated significant interest, alongside inquiry 
into the circumstances that import an obligation of confidence. More spe-
cifically, can there be an obligation where the parties are not in a relation-
ship of confidence? 
                                                  
42   See Prince Albert v. Strange, (1849) 1 Mac. & G. 25, 41 E.R. 1171 (Ch.D.) [Prince Albert 
cited to Mac. & G.]. The plaintiff in that case won on both grounds of breach of trust and 
infringement of property (ibid. at 42). Interestingly, in their highly influential article 
regarding the creation of a common law right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis pointed 
to Prince Albert as a common law copyright case that was in fact protecting a right to 
privacy that now required an independent grounding (supra note 3 at 199-205).  
43   (1948) 65 R.P.C. 203 (Ch.D.) [Saltman]. 
44   R.G. Toulson & C.M. Phipps, Confidentiality (London, U.K.: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996) at 
9. 
45   Saltman, supra note 43 at 215 [emphasis added]. 
46   [1969] R.P.C. 41 at 47-48 (Ch.D.) [references omitted]. 
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 It was the perceived need for a relationship of confidence that led 
Warren and Brandeis to reject breach of confidentiality as a means of pro-
tecting privacy, and to call for the recognition of a more general tort. As 
they argued, such a doctrine 
may have satisfied the demands of society at a time when the abuse 
to be guarded against could rarely have arisen without violating a 
contract or a special confidence; but now that modern devices afford 
abundant opportunities for the perpetration of such wrongs without 
any participation by the injured party, the protection granted by the 
law must be placed upon a broader foundation.47 
When the only way to have a photograph taken was to pose in a studio, 
the law of contract or confidentiality could control its dissemination. How-
ever, with modern photographic technology this is no longer the case: the 
photographer can take a subject’s picture without there being any rela-
tionship of confidentiality involved. 
 However, the law of confidentiality did evolve to catch cases where 
there is no relationship of confidence between parties.48 The first devel-
opment along these lines was to find an obligation where a third party 
discloses information he has received from someone who he knows is un-
der a duty of confidence.49 The second development can be traced to Lord 
Goff’s holding in Guardian that a duty of confidence can arise independ-
ently of a relationship of confidence “where an obviously confidential 
document is wafted by an electric fan out of a window into a crowded 
street, or where an obviously confidential document, such as a private di-
ary, is dropped in a public place and is then picked up by a passer-by.”50 
The salient question is whether this evolution properly catches the kinds 
of privacy cases that Warren and Brandeis were concerned about when 
they rejected breach of confidentiality. And this depends upon whether 
                                                  
47   Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3 at 210-11. 
48   For a good overview of some of the ambiguities in English law regarding the require-
ment of confidentiality in such “privacy” cases, both pre– and post–Campbell, see Ray-
mond Wacks, “Why There Will Never Be an English Common Law Privacy Tort” in An-
drew T. Kenyon & Megan Richardson, eds., New Dimensions in Privacy Law: Interna-
tional and Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 
154; Gavin Phillipson, “The ‘Right’ of Privacy in England and Strasbourg Compared” in 
Andrew T. Kenyon & Megan Richardson, eds., New Dimensions in Privacy Law: Inter-
national and Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 
184; Raymond Wacks, “The Poverty of ‘Privacy’” (1980) 96 Law Q. Rev. 73 at 81-82. 
49   This general proposition was widely agreed upon by the various Law Lords. See Attor-
ney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) (1988), [1990] 1 A.C. 109, [1988] 3 
W.L.R. 776 (H.L.) [Guardian cited to A.C.].  
50   Ibid. at 281. See also Gavin Phillipson, “Transforming Breach of Confidence?: Towards 
a Common Law Right of Privacy under the Human Rights Act” (2003) 66 Mod. L. Rev. 
726. 
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disclosure of an obviously confidential document catches the same cases 
as does the publication of private facts. 
 The argument that it does not is an argument that an action for 
breach of confidentiality, even when not explicitly requiring the breach of 
a confidential relationship, is still ultimately concerned with protecting 
confidential relationships. The reasons for protecting confidences are nu-
merous. As several of the judgments in the House of Lords pointed out, 
the details of Ms. Campbell’s treatment needed to be protected in order to 
protect the therapeutic relationship. Lord Hope stated,  
The therapy is at risk of being damaged if the duty of confidence 
which the participants owe to each other is breached by making de-
tails of the therapy, such as where, when and how often it is being 
undertaken, public.51 
In other words, even if the press learned of Ms. Campbell’s therapy with-
out there being a violation of the confidential relationship between the 
participants in that therapy, publication of this information can nonethe-
less damage that relationship.52  
 But there may be information that is “private” where its publication 
does not threaten any kind of confidence or relationship of trust.53 If the 
House of Lords is protecting “private” information rather than “confiden-
tial” information, then it is shifting the breach of confidence action away 
from where Lord Goff placed it with his willingness to impose a duty of 
confidence regarding obviously confidential documents. The clearest 
statements of such a shift are found in the judgments of Lords Nicholls 
and Hoffman. Lord Nicholls argued that  
[t]he continuing use of the phrase “duty of confidence” and the de-
scription of the information as “confidential” is not altogether com-
fortable. Information about an individual’s private life would not, in 
ordinary usage, be called “confidential”. The more natural descrip-
tion today is that such information is private. The essence of the tort 
is better encapsulated now as misuse of private information.54 
Lord Hoffmann also felt that the law of confidentiality had shifted in a 
fundamental manner. In addition to no longer requiring the violation of a 
confidential relationship, there had been  
                                                  
51   Campbell, supra note 1 at para. 95. 
52   Some commentators argue that a focus on confidentiality, because of its emphasis on re-
lationships, can address cases that the American tort of invasion of privacy cannot. See 
Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, “Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Con-
fidentiality” (2007) 96 Geo. L.J. 123. 
53   See e.g. Peck, supra note 22. 
54   Campbell, supra note 1 at para. 14. 
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the acceptance, under the influence of human rights instruments 
such as article 8 of the [European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms], of the privacy of per-
sonal information as something worthy of protection in its own 
right.55 
Further, 
 [w]hat human rights law has done is to identify private informa-
tion as something worth protecting as an aspect of human autonomy 
and dignity. ... 
 The result of these developments has been a shift in the centre of 
gravity of the action for breach of confidence when it is used as a 
remedy for the unjustified publication of personal information. It 
recognises that the incremental changes to which I have referred do 
not merely extend the duties arising traditionally from a relation-
ship of trust and confidence to a wider range of people. ... Instead of 
the cause of action being based upon the duty of good faith applica-
ble to confidential personal information and trade secrets alike, it fo-
cuses upon the protection of human autonomy and dignity—the 
right to control the dissemination of information about one’s private 
life and the right to the esteem and respect of other people.56 
The shift in breach of confidentiality, although stated differently in two 
judgments, concerns a shift in the nature and status of the protected in-
formation. The traditional breach of confidence action concerns confiden-
tial information, which is information that is kept secret rather than pub-
lic, and is protected because of the importance of protecting confidences 
and relationships of trust. For Lord Nicholls, the need to protect confi-
dences no longer adequately describes the information at issue. Lord 
Hoffman goes further, holding that the protection of “private” information 
is necessary for human autonomy and dignity. 
 As other Law Lords use confidentiality and privacy interchangeably, 
they do not provide a clear view of the shift toward the protection of pri-
vate information. Still, others such as Lord Hope actively resist it: 
The questions that I have just described seem to me to be essentially 
questions of fact and degree and not to raise any new issues of prin-
ciple. ... 
 The language has changed following the coming into operation of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 ... I doubt whether the result is that the 
centre of gravity ... has shifted.57  
                                                  
55   Ibid. at para. 46. 
56   Ibid. at paras. 50-51 [references omitted]. 
57   Ibid. at paras. 85-86. Lord Hope indicated her agreement with this position (ibid. at 
para. 134). 
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On this view, the boundaries of the protection of privacy are clearly 
marked by the principles of confidentiality, no less when the language of 
privacy is adopted. 
 Because the facts of Campbell fit within both the traditional breach of 
confidence action and its purported extension into an action for misuse of 
private information, the disputed relationship between privacy and confi-
dentiality was left unresolved. But it raises a number of important ques-
tions. For example, the breach of confidence model suggests that all that 
is required is an unauthorized use or disclosure of the confidential or pri-
vate information—not widespread publicity, as required by both the New 
Zealand and American versions of the tort of invasion of privacy. Simi-
larly, the breach of confidence model suggests that this misuse of private 
information results in “detriment” but the New Zealand and American 
versions of the tort instead require that the publication be highly offen-
sive. Indeed, the idea that private information is protected only from pub-
licity that is highly offensive was rejected in Campbell. At most, the U.K. 
position is that the test for publicity that is highly offensive is relevant 
only to help identify information as private when it is not easily identified 
as such.58 It is not an additional requirement that narrows tort protection 
to private information, the publication of which is highly offensive. 
 One can see that the scope of the action is considerably narrowed by 
maintaining an emphasis on the protection of confidential information. If 
this does indeed shift to a broader category of information, then the scope 
of the action will likewise be broadened. Liability would be imposed for 
unauthorized disclosure of private information to an individual’s detri-
ment—subject to other considerations such as freedom of expression—
unless another variation of containment anxiety modified this extended 
action even further. 
 Subsequent case law in the United Kingdom has done little to clarify 
the relationship between confidentiality and privacy.59 McKennitt con-
cerned the publication of details of singer Loreena McKennitt’s life by a 
former friend and work associate. Mosley concerned the publication of al-
legations that the claimant, FIA (Fédération Internationale d’Automobile) 
President Max Mosley, had participated in a “Nazi sex orgy”. Although 
these cases refer to Campbell and the newly extended form of the breach 
of confidence action, both the High Court of England and Wales and the 
House of Lords nonetheless viewed the matter before them as an “old-
                                                  
58   Ibid. at para. 94, Lord Hope. 
59   See McKennitt v. Ash, [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2007] 3 W.L.R. 194 [2008] 1 Q.B. 73 
[McKennitt]; Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., [2008] EWHC 1777, [2008] W.L.R. 
259 (Q.B.D.) [Mosley]. 
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fashioned breach of confidence.”60 At the same time, there are some indi-
cations that the emphasis of the extended action is indeed shifting toward 
a more expansive notion of privacy. The most notable example in this re-
gard is Murray, where the Court of Appeal of England and Wales held 
that the child of a famous parent had a “reasonable expectation that he or 
she will not be targeted in order to obtain photographs in a public place 
for publication,” where the photographer knew that it was likely that con-
sent would not be given.61 As this case dealt with whether the claim 
should be struck because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy 
at issue, it remains unclear how this decision will affect the jurisprudence 
regarding the subsequent question of how privacy is to be balanced 
against competing interests.62 Moreover, this case and others are increas-
ingly influenced by jurisprudence regarding article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights,63 which will potentially shift the focus fur-
ther away from traditional ideas of confidentiality and import a very dif-
ferent idea of privacy.64 
 In sum, what I have been calling the privacy impulse is responsible for 
the recognition of some form of the tort of invasion of privacy in jurisdic-
tions such as the United Kingdom and New Zealand, at least insofar as it 
applies to the context of the publication of private facts. In the United 
Kingdom, it is also responsible, in the breach of confidentiality action, for 
a shift away from a concern for confidential information and toward the 
protection of private information, although this shift is far from settled 
law. Nonetheless, this privacy impulse is often curtailed by what I have 
called containment anxiety. This takes several forms in the case law. In 
the United Kingdom, it pushes some judges to resist the shift from confi-
dential information to the potentially broader category of private informa-
tion, understood to protect interests other than confidences. Indeed, even 
in jurisdictions that explicitly recognize privacy as the protected interest, 
judges often implicitly appeal to confidentiality norms and thus narrow 
the scope of protection for privacy. In the United States and New Zealand, 
                                                  
60   McKennitt, supra note 59 at para. 8, Lord Buxton; Mosley, supra note 59 at para. 6 [ref-
erence omitted]. 
61   Murray, supra note 23 at para. 57. 
62   The court indicated that the child had an “arguable” case on the question of whether 
the balance should be struck in his favour and that the case should proceed to trial on 
both points (ibid. at para. 61). 
63   Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 Novem-
ber 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 at 223, Eur. T.S. 5 [ECHR]. 
64   One of the most influential cases to date is Von Hannover (supra note 41) where the 
European Court of Human Rights held that Princess Caroline had a right to privacy in 
“private” activities that are not themselves embarrassing and which may be under-
taken in “public”, such as shopping. 
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the containment anxiety also pushes the courts to require that the publi-
cation of private facts be highly offensive. In some jurisdictions, such as 
the United States, it motivates courts to privilege other values, such as 
freedom of expression, over privacy. 
II. The Justificatory Dilemma  
 One response to the variations of containment anxiety outlined above 
is to see them simply as part of the general drama of tort law: actions are 
recognized and courts struggle to contain the implications of liability 
within reasonable limits. Yet this is insufficient, as legal theory is also 
concerned with this task, which can be rephrased in theoretical terms as 
the question of justification. That is, the question of the nature and scope 
of tort liability can be answered by reference to the underlying justifica-
tion for the imposition of legal liability in the private law context. Liberal 
justifications for such liability have traditionally adopted one of two 
strategies: a focus on harm, or a focus on autonomy. In other words, the 
state is justified in assisting an individual who has been harmed or co-
erced by another. Therefore, if privacy is the kind of interest that merits 
legal protection—rather than simply moral censure—then the situations 
in which we hold there to be a violation must correspond to some cogniza-
ble harm or interference with an individual’s autonomy. Moreover, this 
harm or coercion can help to determine the merited scope of the protec-
tion.  
 I argue in this section that if we do this analysis—if we seek to under-
stand the harm or coercion at stake in cases like Campbell and Hosking—
a surprising conclusion emerges: it is in fact extremely difficult to cast the 
“wrong” at issue in these cases in terms of harm or violation of autonomy. 
Moreover, the precise ways in which it is difficult can account for many of 
the specific features of the containment anxiety outlined previously, such 
as the tendency to revert to confidentiality when determining the scope of 
the privacy tort, the seeking of a threshold of “offensiveness”, and the 
seeming engulfment of the privacy tort by freedom of expression in the 
United States.  
 The justificatory dilemma thus does not shed light on general dilem-
mas in tort law, but rather illuminates the particular nature of privacy. It 
does so in two ways. First, it is descriptive, helping to account for the state 
of the jurisprudence as we find it. Second, it is normative, helping us to 
understand the kind of value that privacy should be best understood to 
protect. On this latter point, the justificatory dilemma indicates that pri-
vacy is not well understood in terms of either protecting individuals from 
harm, or promoting autonomy. 
 It is important to distinguish the justificatory dilemma from what 
might be termed a “definitional dilemma”. One could argue that the best 
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explanation for the containment anxiety found in the cases is not a justifi-
catory dilemma, but rather a definitional dilemma. The literature on pri-
vacy is replete with the observation that privacy is notoriously difficult to 
define.65 Indeed, this has become an axiomatic starting point of many pri-
vacy discussions. However, the definitional dilemma suggests a different 
structure of analysis from what I am proposing here. If the focus of analy-
sis is on the definition of privacy, one must first define privacy, then use 
this definition to identify a violation of privacy in a particular context, and 
finally ask whether such a violation should be protected by law.66 In prac-
tice, these latter two stages of analysis are often conflated and the deter-
mination of a violation of privacy is thought to justify a legal remedy. In 
contrast, if the focus of analysis is on the justification for a legal right to 
privacy, one must first ask what kind of behaviour is thought to constitute 
a legal wrong. Then one must ask whether this behaviour is captured by 
theories of legal wrongs such as harm or coercion—that is, does it crystal-
lize into either harm or coercion of a nature that may justify a legal right? 
In this way, the definitional quagmire is bypassed by asking the question 
of legal justification directly in relation to the behaviour at issue, and not 
in relation to a particular definition of privacy.  
 Since the justificatory approach takes as its point of departure a par-
ticular context of behaviour rather than a particular definition of privacy, 
the following sections do not interrogate a “high-level principle” of pri-
vacy.67 Nor do they focus primarily upon deciphering the meaning of “pub-
lication of private facts” because of the risk that a focus on what consti-
tutes “private facts” will return us to the definitional dilemma that I want 
to sidestep. Instead, the following sections focus on the type of behaviour 
at issue in cases like Campbell and Hosking. In terms that do not pre-
judge the privacy question, one could say that the publication of photos in 
tabloids exposes the subject to increased curiosity and spreads informa-
tion about him or her similar to other practices of gossip. The question at 
issue is therefore not “What is privacy?” but rather “When does the gossip 
and curiosity of others constitute a wrong of the type that justifies legal 
sanctions?”  
 There are two points to note in relation to this latter question. The 
first is that the practices of gossip and curiosity at stake in the celebrity 
publicity cases already discussed are not so different from the original 
                                                  
65   See supra note 5 and accompanying text.  
66   Ruth Gavison’s argument, for example, follows this structure (supra note 4). However, 
Gavison does not get to the question of legal protection but points out that the question 
of identifying a breach of privacy is separate from determining whether the law should 
provide a remedy for this breach. 
67   Wainwright, supra note 16 at para. 18, Lord Hoffmann. 
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concerns that motivated Warren and Brandeis’s argument that the law 
should recognize and protect a right to privacy. As previously discussed, 
they too were concerned with the practice of gossip and its transformation 
by advances in photography and newspaper publication.68 Indeed, gossip 
and curiosity capture many of our contemporary concerns regarding the 
availability of personal information on the internet. John Perry Barlow, 
co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, argues that one implica-
tion of the internet is that everyone leads “as public a life as I do at home” 
in a small town where 
[a]nyone in Pinedale who is interested in me or my doings can get 
most of the information he might seek in the Wrangler Café. Be-
tween them, any five customers could probably produce all that is 
known locally about me, including a [sic] quite a number of items 
which were well known but not true.69 
Therefore a focus on the practices of gossip and curiosity captures impor-
tant intuitions we have regarding privacy in some contexts, while remain-
ing focused on the behaviour at issue and not a particular definition of 
privacy. 
 The second important point is that there is a persistent intuition, also 
reflected in the case law, that the technological augmentation or trans-
formation of the social practices of gossip and curiosity have results that 
merit legal attention.70 Therefore, to focus the justificatory question fur-
ther, we must inquire why and when gossip and curiosity—and in particu-
lar their transformation through modern technology such as publication 
in mass media—justify the imposition of legal liability. 
 The following sections treat this question in detail and conclude as fol-
lows. First, a harm analysis justifies legal liability in the form of the 
American tort of publicity given to private facts, which imposes a thresh-
old of harm (offensiveness) on the type of publicity that is actionable. Sec-
ond, a coercion analysis justifies legal liability in the form of a breach of 
confidentiality action but resists its extension beyond traditional contours 
of confidentiality. Third, both accounts show that limiting freedom of ex-
pression through privacy rights can itself lead to either harm or coercion. 
I thus argue that the most important conclusion to draw from this discus-
sion of justifications is that the wrong arising out of practices of gossip 
and curiosity is not appropriately described in terms of protection from 
                                                  
68   Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3. 
69   John Perry Barlow, “Private Life in Cyberspace” Communications of the ACM 34:8 (Au-
gust 1991) 23. 
70   See Robert Post, “The Legal Regulation of Gossip: Backyard Chatter and the Mass Me-
dia” in Robert F. Goodman & Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, eds., Good Gossip (Lawrence, Kan.: 
University Press of Kansas, 1994) 6. 
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harm or coercion. The alternative that I propose is that liability for such 
practices is better understood in terms of protecting the capacity for iden-
tity formation, upon which I elaborate in the last section of the paper. 
A. The Harm Argument  
 A focus on harm can help to articulate some scenarios in which gossip 
can be deemed wrong. For example, gossip can clearly harm an individ-
ual’s reputation. However, harm to one’s reputation cannot ground a right 
to privacy. Such harm is already protected in private law through the law 
of defamation, and the law of defamation protects only against the dis-
semination of information that is false (under American law) or that can-
not be proven true (in Commonwealth jurisdictions such as in the United 
Kingdom and Canada). For the purposes of defamation law, true but “pri-
vate” information does not receive protection, for one is not entitled to the 
protection of a good reputation gained through the suppression of truth. 
 A focus on reputational harm also does not capture what some see as 
decisive with respect to a claim for privacy. For example, Warren and 
Brandeis argued that the legal right to privacy involves the right to de-
termine when and how one’s thoughts, sentiments, and emotions will be 
communicated to others. Importantly, Warren and Brandeis thought that 
protection for the communication of one’s thoughts, sentiments, and emo-
tions had a “spiritual” rather than material basis, which led them to reject 
any analogy between privacy and defamation.71 The common law of defa-
mation provided an inappropriate conceptual basis from which to derive a 
principle of privacy, they argued, because  
[i]t deals only with damage to reputation, with the injury done to the 
individual in his external relations to the community, by lowering 
him in the estimation of his fellows. The matter published of him, 
however widely circulated, and however unsuited to publicity, must, 
in order to be actionable, have a direct tendency to injure him in his 
intercourse with others ... the effect of the publication upon his esti-
mate of himself and upon his own feelings not forming an essential 
element in the cause of action.72  
In calling for the protection of one’s thoughts, sentiments, and emotions 
from unauthorized publication, therefore, Warren and Brandeis sought to 
protect an individual’s sense of self and not his relationship with others in 
the community as protected by his reputation.  
 Apart from harm to reputation, there is another way to think about 
the harm involved in gossip and curiosity. There is some information 
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about ourselves that, if known by others, would leave us vulnerable to 
harassment, discrimination, or other types of abuse. One could identify 
the types of information that generate such vulnerabilities and protect 
them from collection and dissemination through a right to privacy. This 
information would not necessarily be sensitive or intimate in a traditional 
sense, but rather would simply have to be linked to the problematic prac-
tices listed above. However, it is important to understand that in such 
cases privacy functions more like an anticipatory remedy than a descrip-
tion of the wrong.73 By granting a privacy right over the information, we 
protect an individual against wrongs that are not themselves best de-
scribed as invasions of privacy. For example, if an individual’s HIV status 
is considered private in order to provide some protection against discrimi-
nation, then the wrong at issue is the consequent discrimination and not 
the invasion of privacy. Nonetheless, by protecting against disclosure of 
the information, the discrimination can be prevented, providing a kind of 
remedy in anticipation of the harm.  
 Although this account of privacy as an anticipatory remedy can cap-
ture some important elements of harm that might arise through gossip 
and curiosity, it still does not capture the intuition that seems to be at 
play in many discussions of privacy where privacy, in insulating us from 
gossip and curiosity, also insulates us from forms of social pressure that 
do not crystallize into other, independent harms. For example, Ferdinand 
Schoeman argues that privacy norms “define the presumptive boundaries 
within which it is permissible to apply direct social pressure of account-
ability and of threatened social disgrace.”74 The question then is how to 
define the circumstances under which such social pressure might consti-
tute a harm sufficient to justify a legal right to privacy. 
 One reason for concern about such pressure is its inhibiting effect. For 
example, Gavison has argued that privacy promotes liberty by permitting 
“individuals to do what they would not do without it for fear of an un-
pleasant or hostile reaction from others.”75 These unpleasant reactions 
need not themselves constitute independent wrongs such as harassment 
and discrimination; they may simply impede individual experimentation 
out of the fear of social sanction for unpopular ideas and actions. Instead, 
privacy in this sense protects our ability to act and think in unpopular 
                                                  
73   Austin, supra note 41. 
74   Ferdinand Schoeman, “Gossip and Privacy” in Goodman & Ben-Ze’ev, supra note 70, 72 
at 81-82 [Schoeman, “Gossip”]. 
75   Supra note 4 at 451. 
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ways. Privacy protects individuality understood in terms of our ability to 
be eccentric.76  
 Here, John Stuart Mill’s classic articulation of the harm principle 
within liberal theory can help outline why it is in fact difficult to ground a 
legal right to privacy on this approach, even if from a sociological perspec-
tive it seems to capture something important about the relationship be-
tween gossip and privacy.77 Mill was acutely sensitive to the conditions of 
modern life and the rise of the social sphere. He focused on the social 
sphere as distinct from either the “public” understood as the state or the 
“social” understood as the interactions between discrete individuals. Mill 
argued that society understood collectively can practice “a social tyranny 
more formidable than many kinds of political oppression” and that there 
should be  
a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with indi-
vidual independence; and to find that limit, and maintain it against 
encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human af-
fairs as protection against political despotism.78 
Mill’s general strategy with respect to the tyranny of the social sphere is 
to draw a line between that which concerns only the individual—matters 
for which the individual is not accountable to society—and that which 
concerns one’s relations with others. An individual is accountable to soci-
ety for conduct that concerns others, and in particular, conduct that 
harms others. Therefore society is not justified in judging another for con-
duct that concerns only the individual.79 Based upon the foregoing, we 
could argue that conduct that concerns only the individual should be pro-
tected by a right to privacy and thus shielded from the gossip and curios-
ity of others.  
                                                  
76   See also Edward J. Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to 
Dean Prosser” (1964) 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962. “The man who is compelled to live every 
minute of his life among others and whose every need, thought, desire, fancy or gratifi-
cation is subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived of his individuality and human 
dignity. Such an individual merges with the mass” (ibid. at 1003). 
77   For a contrasting reading of both Mill and Kant in relation to the privacy tort, see 
Megan Richardson, “Whither Breach of Confidence: A Right of Privacy for Australia?” 
(2002) 26 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 381. 
78   John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. by Elizabeth Rapaport (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978) 
at 4-5. 
79   Mill’s line between what concerns the individual and what concerns others governs 
ethical questions as well as legal ones. However, we could argue that if law is to be used 
to protect the individual against unjustified interferences with individual independence 
at the hands of society, then law may only be used in respect of conduct that concerns 
only the individual. 
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 However, Mill’s own analysis would not support such a conclusion.80 
For example, Mill suggests that individuals do not require insulation from 
the effects of being spoken about. In his discussion of the freedom of reli-
gious belief and opinion, Mill agrees that individuals should not be de-
prived of a livelihood because of their beliefs and the social stigma that 
ensues from their profession of opinions not shared by the majority.81 
Nonetheless, he draws a line between social coercion aimed at depriving 
an individual of his livelihood, and social censure that simply leads to an 
individual being ill-thought of, a result which “ought not to require a very 
heroic mold to enable them to bear.”82 Put another way, being ill-thought 
of is not an unjustified interference with individual autonomy. This sup-
ports privacy understood in terms of an anticipatory remedy that can help 
protect individuals from harms like discrimination, but it does not sup-
port privacy understood in terms of insulation from social pressure that 
does not rise to this level of harm. 
 Indeed, Mill’s analysis allows for a wide scope of social censure. He ar-
gues that even with respect to that which concerns only the individual 
(which is his boundary demarcating individual liberty from social inter-
ference), society can express its disapprobation through “[a]dvice, instruc-
tion, persuasion, and avoidance by other people, if thought necessary by 
them for their own good.”83 He elaborates: 
In these various modes a person may suffer very severe penalties at 
the hands of others for faults which directly concern only himself; 
but he suffers these penalties only in so far as they are natural and, 
as it were, the spontaneous consequences of the faults themselves, 
not because they are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of pun-
ishment.84 
Therefore others have a right to express their own individuality, as well 
as their own beliefs, which will inevitably involve talking about others in 
a negative manner. Given this, individuals may talk about others so long 
as this “gossip” does not take the form of intentional punishment or go so 
far as to deprive an individual of his or her livelihood. Even if the gossip is 
about individual concerns and not those of society, an individual has no 
right to be insulated from it. Such gossip is understood to be the “sponta-
neous consequences” of the faults themselves, or part of the right of other 
individuals to express their opinions. Some of these concerns might be ac-
                                                  
80   See also Ferdinand David Schoeman, Privacy and Social Freedom (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1992) at 24ff. 
81   Mill, supra note 78 at 30-31. 
82   Ibid. at 31. 
83   Ibid. at 93. 
84   Ibid. at 76. 
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commodated through the requirements, such as in American and New 
Zealand tort law, that publication be extensive and offensive, making the 
expression about another more like the “parading” or “punishing” that 
Mill states is not acceptable.  
 However, there is still another major source of difficulty for Mill in ar-
ticulating a concern for privacy: freedom of expression. A legal right to 
privacy looks like a legal restraint on speech and for Mill, the chief protec-
tion of individual liberty and diversity in the face of social tyranny is not 
privacy but freedom of speech. To recognize a right not to be talked about 
would be to stifle the speech of others. In fact, Mill seems to recognize a 
tension between the intersubjective elements of speech and his division 
between conduct that concerns an individual and conduct that concerns 
others:  
The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall 
under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the con-
duct of an individual which concerns other people, but, being almost 
of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself and resting in 
great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it.85  
Mill can then be interpreted as coming down in favour of treating speech 
like thought, which concerns only an individual, rather than as an action 
that also concerns others. In doing so, speech takes primacy over any kind 
of concern that might ground a right to privacy.86 This is reflected in the 
American experience with the tort of invasion of privacy. As discussed 
earlier, cases like Florida Star call into question whether a privacy inter-
est can ever withstand a claim to freedom of expression, and in particular, 
freedom of the press.87 Although courts in both the United Kingdom and 
New Zealand have disagreed with this primacy of freedom of expression, 
we can see that the justification for this objection faces some obstacles. 
 For all of these reasons, grounding a legal right to privacy in an analy-
sis of the harm of gossip and curiosity faces some significant hurdles in 
moving beyond an understanding of privacy as an anticipatory remedy for 
other harms. Claims to privacy look like claims to insulation from the so-
cial pressure resulting from others’ inquisitiveness into our lives and their 
gossip about us—a social pressure that promotes a kind of social confor-
mity. It is difficult to justify legal coercion to vindicate this interest unless 
it causes some kind of injury. This explains the popularity of the test that 
                                                  
85   Ibid. at 11-12. 
86   This seems to be where American tort jurisprudence is heading. See David A. Ander-
son, “The Failure of American Privacy Law” in Basil S. Markesinis, ed., Protecting Pri-
vacy: The Clifford Chance Lectures, vol. 4 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) 
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the publicity of private facts be highly offensive, since this requirement 
singles out cases where there is significant “humiliation and distress.”88 
Importantly, whatever harms arise from this pressure need to be viewed 
in light of the speech interest of others. It is difficult to articulate why dif-
fuse social pressure that does not rise to the level of more defined and 
tangible harms should take precedence over a right to speech, especially 
when a right to speech can itself promote individual diversity. Through a 
justificatory lens, a Millian, harm-based argument for a private law right 
to privacy is thus left looking like the American version of the tort of pub-
licity given to private life.  
B. The Coercion Argument  
 Apart from a focus on harms, the second major liberal strategy for 
grounding legal rights is a focus on autonomy or freedom from the coer-
cion of others where that coercion is understood in relation to individual 
freedom rather than individual harm. Of course, there are diverse ac-
counts of autonomy and of its relevance to questions of legal rights. One 
dominant account of autonomy is that of Kant and this section outlines 
the significant hurdles it also faces in articulating why gossip and curios-
ity could amount to a legal, rather than an ethical wrong.  
 Kant’s division between external and internal freedom illuminates the 
hurdles faced by this account of autonomy. The doctrine of right, concern-
ing what Kant refers to as external lawgiving, explicates the conditions of 
external freedom. Kant describes this as a matter of the reciprocal rela-
tion of choice in which the wishes, needs, and ends of the other are irrele-
vant. He writes, “Right is ... the sum of the conditions under which the 
choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a 
universal law of freedom.”89 In contrast, Kant’s doctrine of virtue concerns 
duties of inner freedom.90 Inner freedom pertains to the motivation for ac-
tion, which must be self-chosen and self-legislated rather than imposed. 
Consequently, the “duties of virtue are duties for which there is no exter-
nal lawgiving.”91 Therefore, for Kant a legal right is one that protects an 
individual’s external freedom—his or her agency—from violation by oth-
ers.  
                                                  
88   Hosking, supra note 2 at para. 128 (Gault and Blanchard JJ. indicate that it is “hu-
miliation and distress” that is the harm involved in invasion of privacy and not personal 
injury or economic loss).  
89   Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. by Mary Gregor, ed. (New York: 
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90   See ibid. at 164-65. 
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 The boundaries of what is considered an impermissible violation of ex-
ternal freedom are set by the idea of the equal agency of all. A Kantian 
account of a legal right to privacy would therefore have to show that the 
gossip and curiosity of others can in some instances violate external free-
dom. In this regard it is important to note that the violation of external 
freedom need not result in an injury to an individual. For example, if an-
other takes what is mine and uses it for his or her own purposes, then I 
am wronged. This is the classic articulation of a trespass to land: you can-
not take and use my property without my consent even if such use causes 
me no injury.92 A Kantian account of privacy therefore has the potential to 
reorient the debate of privacy away from a focus on the effects and harms 
of gossip and curiosity. Indeed, it could ground a claim for a privacy inva-
sion where someone was surreptitiously monitored and never found out 
about it.  
 The key to a Kantian justification of privacy is therefore to ground a 
sense in which information about me is “mine”, such that in collecting it 
and using it for your own purposes you wrong me. However, as outlined 
below, such an approach faces a number of significant hurdles in justify-
ing the “mineness” of such information. These hurdles can help to explain 
why courts face a constant temptation to move back toward a confidential-
ity paradigm, why concerns regarding harm continue to intrude upon the 
analysis, and why freedom of expression is such a potent countervailing 
interest. 
 For Kant, my reputation is “mine”. As he argues, “a good reputation is 
an innate external belonging, though an ideal one only, which clings to 
the subject as a person.”93 Gossip that affects another’s reputation would 
therefore violate that individual’s external freedom. However, as noted in 
the previous discussion regarding harm, this would ground a right against 
the spreading of only false information, not true information, and so 
would not protect an individual’s desire to have some true facts kept from 
further circulation. In other words, it grounds the legal doctrine of defa-
mation but not privacy. 
 What, then, about the many things that I endeavour to keep private? 
Here Kant’s distinction between physical possession and rightful posses-
sion, as outlined in his discussion of property, is helpful. My innate right 
to my body means that I have a right to an apple while I am holding it; to 
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interfere with this possession is to interfere with my right to occupy a par-
ticular space. However, if I put the apple down then you wrong me only if 
I can additionally claim that the apple is my property—that it is some-
thing over which I have rightful, and not merely actual, possession.94 
Similarly, if I endeavour to keep my thoughts, emotions, and sensations 
private, then your interference with the steps I take to do so is an inter-
ference with my innate right to personality. However, once I choose to 
communicate them then there must be a different basis for my entitle-
ment to my thoughts, emotions, and sensations. If a right to privacy is to 
be more expansive than something like secrecy—which seems to be at 
stake in the move from confidentiality to privacy—then what is needed is 
an understanding of privacy analogous to the rightful possession of the 
apple.  
 One way to create such an account is to focus on the relationship be-
tween the individual who communicates her thoughts and the individual 
who then makes some further use of this communication. Through invok-
ing the norms of contract or confidentiality, a Kantian account could allow 
for some of these uses to be wrongful. For example, an individual who re-
ceives letters from you on the understanding that these are confidential 
wrongs you in publishing them. But these doctrines would not catch the 
case of a stranger seeking to publish my private letters, unless this piggy-
backs upon the initial relationship, such as when a stranger understands 
that the information at issue has been obtained through a breach of confi-
dence. As discussed, this still does not catch private information per se. 
 Since technology permits access to an individual’s thoughts, emotions, 
and sensations without this access violating any special relationship, 
Warren and Brandeis argued that what is required is a right against the 
world such as that afforded by property, not by confidentiality or contract. 
By this they did not mean the traditional doctrine of property such as 
one’s property in the home. Historically, the protection afforded by tres-
pass went a long way to protect the privacy of the home. But such protec-
tion is vulnerable to the critique that technology makes it possible to in-
trude on others without actually violating any property right. Instead, 
Warren and Brandeis grounded their argument in common law cases re-
garding copyright protection for unpublished works, which granted indi-
viduals a right to prevent the publication of original expression. They ar-
gued that such cases were better understood as applications of a more 
general right to privacy than as intellectual property cases and should 
therefore be expanded to protect one’s thoughts, emotions, and sensations 
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regardless of form: “whether expressed in writing, or in conduct, in con-
versation, in attitudes, or in facial expression.”95 
 Would Kant recognize such protection for private letters and would he 
allow for the expansion of such protection in the manner sought by War-
ren and Brandeis? Kant clearly recognizes a right against the copying of 
books. A book, according to Kant, “represents a discourse that someone 
delivers to the public by visible linguistic signs.”96 No one else may attach 
his name to another’s work, for this would be to pass oneself off as the au-
thor. Similarly, if an author speaks in his own name through a book, a 
publisher speaks in the name of the author and may rightfully do so only 
with the permission of the author.97 However, the wrong involved in pub-
lishing without the author’s permission is the wrong “of stealing the prof-
its from the publisher who was appointed by the author.”98 It is not clear 
how this wrong would extend to someone who is publishing previously 
unpublished material without the author’s permission. It is also not clear 
how it would extend to someone who wanted to comment on the private 
communication of another and so was more in the position of a journalist 
than a publisher who could be said to be speaking in the name of the au-
thor.99 
 Furthermore, it is not clear that Kant would extend his analysis of 
copyright in the manner argued for by Warren and Brandeis, to include 
protection from the unauthorized dissemination of one’s thoughts, emo-
tions, and sensations in whatever form. Kant distinguishes writing from 
other kinds of works such as “an etching which represents a certain per-
son in a portrait, or a work in plaster that is a bust” for these, unlike writ-
ing, are immediate signs of a concept.100 To interfere with another’s use of 
such signs would presumably interfere with an individual’s freedom to 
communicate his own thoughts. Similarly, to grant an individual the con-
trol over disseminating details of one’s personal appearance, acts, and re-
                                                  
95   Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3 at 206. 
96   Kant, supra note 89 at 71.  
97   Ibid.  
98   Ibid. 
99   Perhaps a Kantian account could accommodate some alleged misuses of images similar 
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lationships would be to interfere with the ability to express one’s opinion 
about another. 
 In fact, there is a strong basis upon which to argue that for Kant, 
speaking about others is generally something that one does as a matter of 
right rather than something that violates rights. This is because the prin-
ciple of innate freedom implicitly involves the authorization  
to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is 
theirs, so long as they do not want to accept it—such things as 
merely communicating his thoughts to them, telling or promising 
them something, whether what he says is true and sincere or untrue 
and insincere (veriloquium aut falsiloquium); for it is entirely up to 
them whether they want to believe him or not.101 
In a footnote to this statement, Kant elaborates that intentionally telling 
an untruth is considered a lie “in the sense of bearing upon rights” when it 
deprives another of what is his, such as “the false allegation that a con-
tract has been concluded with someone.”102 Therefore for Kant, communi-
cation to others is presumptively authorized even if it involves insincere 
falsehoods so long as such communication does not affect another’s exter-
nal freedom. As has been argued, it is difficult to determine how such 
communication could affect another’s external freedom apart from the 
limited protection afforded by defamation, contract, confidentiality, and 
copyright.  
 Indeed, for Kant, a general concern for how others talk about an indi-
vidual falls more directly within the realm of ethics than law. Consider 
Kant’s discussion of what he calls defamation, which is closer to the sense 
of gossip that we are concerned with. Kant argues: 
 The intentional spreading (propalatio) of something that detracts 
from another’s honor—even if it is not a matter of public justice, and 
even if what is said is true—diminishes respect for humanity as 
such, so as finally to cast a shadow of worthlessness over our race it-
self, making misanthropy (shying away from human beings) or con-
tempt the prevalent cast of mind, or to dull one’s moral feeling by 
repeatedly exposing one to the sight of such things and accustoming 
one to it. It is, therefore, a duty of virtue not to take malicious pleas-
ure in exposing the faults of others so that one will be thought as 
good as, or at least not worse than, others, but rather to throw the 
veil of benevolence over their faults, not merely by softening our 
judgments but also by keeping these judgments to ourselves; for ex-
amples of respect that we give others can arouse their striving to de-
serve it.—For this reason, a mania for spying on the morals of others 
(allotrio-episcopia) is by itself already an offensive inquisitiveness on 
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the part of anthropology, which everyone can resist with right as a 
violation of the respect due him.103 
Kant therefore classifies defamation, understood here as malicious gossip, 
as a vice that violates the duty of respect that we owe to other human be-
ings. However, such a violation concerns the violator’s inner motivation: 
his failure is a failure to treat another as an end in itself. This is why the 
violation is a matter of the doctrine of virtue and not the doctrine of right. 
In other words, one can lack respect for another without violating his or 
her external freedom.104  
 Kant does argue, however, that one of the duties of right is the duty of 
rightful honour, which he expresses as, “Do not make yourself a mere 
means for others but be at the same time an end for them.”105 One could 
argue that this duty would allow an individual, as a matter of right, to re-
sist being treated as a means even if this treatment falls short of consti-
tuting a violation of external freedom. That is, one might have a privilege 
to resist treatment that involves a lack of respect even if one does not 
have a right to bring a claim against the disrespectful perpetrator. This 
privilege appears to be the basis for Kant’s statement that we can resist 
the offensive inquisitiveness of others “with right”: I can resist the prying 
of others and have no obligation to co-operate in their inquisitiveness. But 
if someone finds out something about me through some other means and 
spreads this gossip, I have no legal claim against them.  
 Does something particular to mass media make a difference such that 
we could make sense of the requirement of “publicity”? It may be that the 
significance of mass media, and other contemporary forms of information 
and communications technology, is that they make the prying of others 
more effective and individual efforts at resistance less effective. For ex-
ample, suppose that I enter a restaurant and see my neighbour there with 
a man who is not her husband. Apart from taking steps to avoid detection, 
my neighbour has no legal claim to prevent me from telling others about 
it the next day. Suppose that instead I publish this information on a com-
munity bulletin board on the internet. This is even a greater interference 
with my neighbour’s attempts to avoid detection, as it dramatically ex-
pands the number of people who can now “observe” her. Nonetheless, 
unless these practices somehow affect the nature of the relationship be-
tween me and my neighbour, then it is difficult to see how an individual’s 
                                                  
103  Ibid. at 212 [emphasis added, references omitted]. 
104  Kant would probably also accept that the effect that such gossip has on an individual’s 
self-estimation is important as a matter of moral anthropology. 
105  Ibid. at 29. 
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external freedom is violated. She has a privilege to resist; I do not wrong 
her by prying, even if in doing so I act unethically. 
 A Kantian approach to privacy therefore faces a number of significant 
hurdles in articulating an account of privacy. Moreover, many of these dif-
ficulties are similar to those that arose in the previous discussion of harm. 
First, it is difficult to isolate a general concern for the wrong of gossip and 
curiosity apart from more specific wrongs such as defamation or breach of 
confidentiality. Second, any attempt to do so quickly encounters conflict 
with freedom of speech, and a strong entitlement to freedom of speech is 
easier to ground than a strong entitlement to privacy. The result is that 
any kind of strong censure against the practices of gossip and curiosity, 
even when enhanced by mass media, must be a matter of moral but not 
legal concern. At most, a Kantian approach would endorse grounding pri-
vacy claims in breach of confidentiality. This review of a Kantian ap-
proach to privacy therefore gives an account of why one recurring version 
of the judicial containment anxiety regarding privacy is either to revert to 
a confidentiality paradigm, or to resist a shift out of it in the first place. 
III. Alternatives: Identity versus Authenticity 
 The justificatory dilemma, as outlined in the previous section, leaves 
several options open. The first option is to follow Mill and create a justifi-
cation for the American version of the tort of publicity given to private life, 
with its requirement of harm and its threatened engulfment by freedom of 
expression. The second is to follow Kant and provide protection only for 
breach of confidentiality, with its focus on the protection of confidential re-
lationships rather than a particular category of information. Each of the 
first two options has costs, because each considerably narrows the range 
of privacy claims that the law is able to protect. The third option is to re-
ject both horns of the dilemma. Rather than using the justificatory di-
lemma as a means to narrow privacy protection, we can use it to shed 
light on the nature of what I have been calling the emerging privacy im-
pulse.  
 The most important thing that the justificatory dilemma tells us is 
that the value protected by a robust private law right to privacy is neither 
autonomy nor freedom from certain kinds of harms. If we can understand 
the nature of the wrong involved in the practices of gossip and curiosity—
and their technological augmentation or transformation—in different 
terms, then perhaps we can answer the justificatory dilemma without 
narrowing the scope of legal protection of privacy.  
 One way to re-envision the question of what kind of value the right to 
privacy protects is to argue that privacy is an important condition for 
autonomy, but is nonetheless conceptually distinct from the individual lib-
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erties that are seen to secure freedom in a liberal democracy. Thus, for 
example, Beate Rössler argues:  
If we consider the telos of freedom to be autonomy and thus the pos-
sibility of asking oneself what sort of person one wants to be and 
how one wants to live, and if civil liberties guarantee just this 
(within the well-known limits), it is clear that—when it comes to the 
question of how one would like to live—violations of privacy restrict 
or tie a person down in a way that contradicts the spirit of civil liber-
ties demanded and secured, but that for a variety of reasons is not or 
cannot be prevented by the civil liberties themselves.106 
On such a view, privacy protects individuals in their ability to reflect on 
the kind of person they would like to be and on how they would like to 
live.107 In this sense, privacy protects aspects of one’s self-relationship: 
one’s ability to assess and appraise personal choices and to live an au-
thentic life. Rössler’s approach is promising, as it provides us with a way 
of understanding the significance of being insulated from the gossip and 
curiosity of others—and its attendant social pressure—in a manner that 
relates directly to the value of autonomy, without the need to establish 
that violations of privacy are themselves direct violations of autonomy.  
 Although generally helpful at outlining one of the values protected by 
privacy, this approach nonetheless faces its own difficulties in justifying a 
private law right to privacy, particularly of the kind at issue in cases of 
publication of private facts.108 For example, Rössler does not deal with this 
particular legal question but does deal with the analogous issue of surrep-
titious surveillance, which she views as a paradigmatic violation of infor-
mational privacy.109 One could argue that the publication of private facts 
is akin to placing someone under surreptitious surveillance and then plac-
ing the results of this surveillance in public view. The problem with such 
practices, on her account, is that they result in an individual acting upon 
false assumptions regarding what others know about her, compromising 
her ability to engage in authentic behaviour toward others. However, even 
if one accepts this account, it does not show why the publication of private 
facts is problematic: prior to their publication, one acts under the true as-
                                                  
106  Beate Rössler, The Value of Privacy, trans. by R.D.V. Glasgow (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity 
Press, 2005) at 73 [emphasis in original]. 
107  See ibid. at 50-73. I have adopted a similar account to help understand some aspects of 
privacy (Austin, supra note 41). See also Jeffrey H. Reiman, “Driving to the Panopticon: 
A Philosophical Exploration of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology 
of the Future” (1995) 11 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 27. 
108  Rössler is not making a claim about a legal right to privacy and argues that her under-
standing of privacy still permits one to draw further distinctions between legal, moral, 
and conventional claims to privacy (Kant, supra note 89 at 75). 
109  See ibid. at 116-17. 
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sumption that such facts are not generally known and after their publica-
tion, one acts under the true assumption that such facts are now gener-
ally known. Indeed, the problem of false assumptions can be generally 
remedied though widespread publication and dissemination of “private” 
information as much as through respect for privacy norms. Once the re-
sults of surreptitious surveillance are publicized, there is no problem of 
false assumptions and therefore no problem regarding authenticity. 
 Rössler has a slightly different rationale for why known surveillance is 
problematic. When an individual knows that she is being observed, she 
adapts her behaviour accordingly. This adaptation, according to Rössler, 
also interferes with authenticity: one acts in ways one would not have 
acted if unobserved. The problem is that instead of having one’s behaviour 
issue from one’s own beliefs and values, one instead acts in reaction to the 
reality of observation—observation that therefore inhibits an authentic 
relation with one’s self. However, even if one accepts this account, it still 
does not show why the publication of private facts is problematic. In the 
typical fact scenario of such a case, one does not know that one is being 
observed until after publication. When Naomi Campbell attended Narcot-
ics Anonymous, she did not know that she was being observed and so did 
not change her behaviour in response to this observation. The subsequent 
publication of the details of her treatment does not change the character 
of her original action. To say, “had I known this would be in the papers I 
would not have engaged in this behaviour” does not mean that the origi-
nal behaviour was inauthentic—it just means that you did not want oth-
ers to know of it. Part of the difficulty is that if privacy protects self-
relation with respect to some behaviour, then it is unclear how publicity 
that is unanticipated and that occurs after-the-fact could retroactively al-
ter this self-relation, thereby rendering the behaviour inauthentic. The 
only case that Rössler’s view of known surveillance could account for is 
when publication, because of its predictability or prevalence, effectively 
amounts to a kind of anticipated surveillance that would have the inhibit-
ing effects she describes. This might include instances where certain ce-
lebrities are routinely followed and hounded by the press.110 
 A similar version of the authenticity thesis is one that I have put for-
ward in the past: in presenting yourself to others (e.g., when you are in 
public), your presentation is governed by the norms applicable to that par-
                                                  
110  This analysis might catch a case like Von Hannover where the European Court of Hu-
man Rights found the publications of photographs of Princess Caroline involved in a 
number of everyday activities to be a violation of her privacy under article 8 of the 
ECHR (supra note 63) but in doing so stressed factors such as “a climate of continual 
harassment” that such photos induced in the particular circumstances. See Von Han-
nover, supra note 41 at para. 59. 
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ticular context. We require some respite from this context if we are to 
fully affirm those aspects of our thoughts and identity as in fact ours and 
not a simple response to the desire to conform to these norms of presenta-
tion.111 Although this accounts for some of our intuitions regarding why 
privacy is valuable, and shows why a society of widespread surveillance is 
problematic, it also faces difficulties in accounting for the legal right to 
privacy as we find it in tort law. It is one thing to argue that we need 
some respite from the public gaze in order to forge an authentic self, and 
quite another to assert that the particular gaze of a particular other in 
fact interferes with this project of authenticity.  
 A more promising account of privacy views the value of privacy as pro-
tecting one’s identity rather than one’s authenticity, autonomy, or free-
dom from harm. Before I outline why an identity-based account avoids the 
difficulties inherent in an authenticity account, let me outline why it also 
provides a route out of the justificatory dilemma. 
 Liberal justifications for rights based upon notions of either harm or 
coercion remain neutral with respect to the particular ends of individuals 
affected. Indeed, this is consistent with a general view of the common law, 
and the role of the courts, whereby the common law protects a realm of 
individual freedom rather than a particular vision of the good. Because of 
this, private law discussions often proceed in abstraction from the particu-
larities of any individual’s actual identity, including their beliefs, desires, 
and needs.112 Nonetheless, this does not mean that the law should be un-
concerned with an individual’s capacity to construct his or her identity. 
Indeed, one could argue that liberal accounts of rights either presuppose 
or at least are strongly compatible with the idea that individuals have an 
identity and that individuals have the capacity to participate in its con-
struction.  
 The idea of identity at stake here is not my own idea of myself result-
ing from a process of self-reflection and does not rely upon any idea of a 
“true”, “inner”, or authentic self. Instead, the idea of identity that I want 
to invoke is that of the “self” that one presents to others—one’s “public” 
persona, or “social self”.113 This “self” that is presented may or may not dif-
fer in relation to different “others”, and may or may not vary over time, 
                                                  
111  Austin, supra note 41 at 146. 
112  Weinrib’s version of formalism provides an extreme example of this: Ernest J. Weinrib, 
The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
113  The language of “self-presentation” involves an implicit reference to Goffman (supra 
note 6). For an account of how the idea of self-presentation is linked to the experience of 
shame, see J. David Velleman, “The Genesis of Shame” (2001) 30 Philos. & Pub. Aff. 27. 
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across contexts and social roles in contradictory ways.114 In short, this is a 
very “thin” notion of identity that focuses simply on one’s ability to pre-
sent oneself to others. It is therefore quite different from ideas of identity 
that have been invoked by other legal theorists. For example, some out-
line the connection between privacy and identity in terms of “personhood”, 
which itself is variously understood in terms of the protection of choices 
that are seen as intrinsic to one’s identity,115 the “integrity” of one’s iden-
tity,116 and the conditions under which a society recognizes that an indi-
vidual’s “existence is his own.”117 Others argue that privacy protects the 
capacity of individuals to withdraw from the demands of social interaction 
in order to protect the development of individuality or even authentic-
ity.118 In contrast, one can be concerned about an individual’s capacity for 
identity formation in the sense of “self-presentation” while remaining in-
different to these other questions regarding the particular nature and 
quality of one’s identity. 
 Although identity, on this understanding, is always constructed in re-
lation with and to others, it is problematic from the perspective of liberal-
ism to posit that this identity is fully constructed by others. Therefore, 
just as the claim that one has complete self-sovereignty over identity is 
implausible, so too is the claim that one has no role in its creation. There 
must be some capacity to participate in the construction of one’s iden-
tity—some ability to determine whether some elements are disclosed to 
others, to whom they are disclosed, and in what circumstances.  
 Although a full account of the relationship between this idea of one’s 
capacity for identity formation and justifications for legal rights is beyond 
the scope of this paper, this argument at least establishes the plausibility 
of this claim. Identity therefore provides a potentially fruitful way out of 
                                                  
114  There is some emerging legal scholarship that looks at the relationship between privacy 
and identity in a manner that recognizes the relational aspect of identity rather than 
making an identity simply a matter of one’s own view. For example, Brian C. Murchi-
son proposes that the American public disclosure action rests on a concept of privacy as 
“liberty to develop character through close, dialogic relationships with others”: Brian C. 
Murchison, “Revisiting the American Public Disclosure Action” in Kenyon & Richard-
son, supra note 48, 32 at 55. 
115  See e.g. Jean L. Cohen, “Is There a Duty of Privacy? Law, Sexual Orientation, and the 
Construction of Identity” (1996) 6 Tex. J. Women & L. 47 at 76ff.; Aaron J. Rappaport, 
“Beyond Personhood and Autonomy: Moral Theory and the Premises of Privacy” (2001) 
Utah L. Rev. 441 at 452. 
116  Jonathan Kahn, “Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance” (2003) 33 Seton 
Hall L. Rev. 371. 
117  Jeffrey H. Reiman, “Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood” (1976) 6 Philos. & Publ. Aff. 26 
at 39. 
118  Rössler, supra note 106; Austin, supra note 41. 
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privacy’s justificatory dilemma by positing an alternative to autonomy or 
harm as the justification for the imposition of legal liability. Distinct from 
values such as autonomy, identity still fits within a recognizable family of 
liberal interests that underpin much of our liberal legal tradition and pro-
vide the justification for legal liability. One could even argue that to be 
harmed or to act autonomously presupposes an individual who at least 
has this bare capacity for identity formation, however poorly it may be ex-
ercised. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether identity can provide a 
compelling basis for understanding privacy. What does an identity ac-
count of privacy look like and how does it differ from other accounts? 
 Once we turn to identity as our central focus, a privacy claim must be 
conceived in terms of protecting the conditions of self-presentation rather 
than as a claim to insulate us from the social pressure that might result 
from a particular self-presentation. Basic to this idea of self-presentation 
is the requirement that you know the “who” to whom you present your-
self. It is not the case that you present yourself to the world in general, 
and then particular others may or may not think well of this presentation 
for a myriad of reasons. The claim here is that the very idea of self-
presentation includes the idea of presentation to someone, to an audience. 
It is not a kind of bare self-assertion but an act of social communication—
an act that depends upon knowing the “who” to whom one is communicat-
ing. Knowledge of this “who” therefore does not go simply to one’s effec-
tiveness in creating an identity but to one’s basic capacity for doing so. 
Privacy violations involve disruptions in this communication—for exam-
ple, by changing the identity of one’s audience through surreptitious sur-
veillance or unexpected publication. 
 Consider the following two examples of information disclosure, one of 
which is a privacy violation, and one of which is not. First, suppose that 
you tell another academic colleague, “X was invited to visit Yale.” You 
have disseminated information about X to another colleague, but few of us 
would consider this gossip. Contrast this with a second scenario, in which 
you instead tell your colleague, “X is having an affair with Y.” Now you 
have disseminated information about X to another colleague and most of 
us would consider this to be gossip. The difference between the two sce-
narios is that in the second you have passed along information that X 
would likely not want other professional colleagues to know about. It is in 
this sense “private” where “private” simply refers to information that one 
would not want to be part of one’s self-presentation to a particular audi-
ence. In contrast, in the first example it is unlikely that X did not want 
her work colleagues to know that she had been invited to visit Yale even if 
she had not yet told them. The difference between the two examples—
what makes the second gossip and the first merely the dissemination of 
social knowledge—is the fact that one involves “private” information 
whereas the other does not. Moreover, we can understand what “private” 
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means through reference to the idea of self-presentation rather than some 
inherent features of the information itself or the delineation of a “private 
sphere”. For example, the things that we conventionally label “private” in 
relation to our professional lives are the things that most of us would not 
want to be part of our self-presentation in a professional context. In this 
way, conventional markers are helpful in that they alert us to situations 
where individuals might not have wanted information to be disclosed to a 
particular audience. (For example, most of us would think it is inappro-
priate for employers and colleagues to find out about one’s sexual history.) 
But they are a proxy for the individual’s determination regarding the 
“self” that she wants to present to a particular audience. 
 This analysis of privacy in terms of self-presentation highlights an im-
portant difference between an identity account of privacy and a harm ac-
count of privacy. Importantly, the focus is on the self-presentation aspect, 
and not on how this presentation is received or dealt with by the intended 
audience, or on the social pressure that others may bring in relation to 
particular presentations. Therefore, on this account, the United States 
and New Zealand’s limitation of liability to publications that are “highly 
offensive” is mistaken. Instead, this approach would endorse the House of 
Lords’s position that described the test for offensiveness as helpful to the 
identification of a privacy violation in cases where it was unclear.119 
 However, an identity-based account of privacy would also call into 
question some of the features of the U.K. position regarding confidential-
ity. First, while a focus on self-presentation retains a relational compo-
nent to privacy that is analogous to confidentiality, it is nonetheless a 
much broader notion of relationship. One’s capacity to present oneself to 
others does not depend on a confidential relationship with others even if it 
does depend on knowing who the others are. Second, the U.K. position on 
confidentiality left open the question of whether publication was required 
for liability, or whether mere disclosure of “private” information is suffi-
cient. As I outline below, a violation of privacy understood in terms of a 
capacity for self-presentation will usually require publication. 
 The mere dissemination of private information does not necessarily 
imply a violation of privacy. If privacy is a claim to protect the conditions 
of self-presentation, then a violation of privacy will occur only when the 
dissemination of private information also undermines one’s capacity for 
self-presentation. It is not the case that simply passing along information 
about X that she would not wish to pass along undermines her own self-
presentation to others. Schoeman helpfully observes, 
                                                  
119  Campbell, supra note 1 at para. 94. 
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We surely invade a colleague’s privacy if we announce at a meeting 
that she and our secretary are having an affair. Norms of privacy 
make this sort of disclosure unconscionable. Norms of privacy, how-
ever, do not make it seem as serious, or even at all serious, if we 
simply privately relate the same information to each person in the 
department. What we mean by privacy, then, or invading a person’s 
privacy, is not the fact of disclosing personal information to a variety 
of people without the consent of the object of discourse, but the 
means by which the private information is distributed. Thus, charac-
terizations of gossip as revelation are incomplete or misleading. We 
must differentiate dissemination from publication. Publication 
means dissemination plus the conversion of a matter that is personal 
into a matter that is “open” or acknowledged as a “public fact.”120 
For Schoeman, the significance of “public facts” is that they bring with 
them a set of norms whereby it is appropriate for others to hold you ac-
countable for such facts and to use social pressure to do so. Since gossip 
operates “behind the back” and does not deal with public facts, it “permits 
a person to maintain a public face” insulated from this pressure.121 Placed 
in terms of an account of privacy as protecting the conditions of self-
presentation irrespective of any attendant social pressure, we can say 
that the dissemination of “private” information affects one’s self-
presentation only when it becomes a “public fact”. For example, upon 
“publication” that X is having an affair with Y, X has little choice but to 
make this information part of her self-presentation, or to revise some 
element of her self-presentation to reflect this. Unlike in the case of the 
colleague who knows about the affair but does not let on that he knows, 
she can no longer “save face” or maintain her original self-presentation as 
if nobody knows.122 This can account for why American privacy law has 
generally not imposed liability for gossip unless the information is pub-
lished.123 
 We can see the difference that the “publication” requirement makes by 
re-examining Campbell. Naomi Campbell did not want to disclose to the 
public any information, either of a general or specific nature, regarding 
her treatment for drug addiction. For this reason, we can say that the 
Daily Mirror disseminated “private” information. The salient distinction 
is not between public and private spheres of life, but rather between the 
types of audiences to which Campbell did and did not want to present this 
                                                  
120  Schoeman, “Gossip”, supra note 74 at 80-81. 
121  Ibid. at 81. 
122  This can also explain why so many people feel shame upon such disclosures. As Velle-
man argues, the experience of shame is closely linked to inadequacy in one’s capacity 
for self-presentation (supra note 113 at 38). 
123  See Post, supra note 70. It should be noted that a gossiper might nonetheless be liable 
in defamation law even if the remarks are not “published” in this sense. 
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aspect of her self. However, although this information is private in rela-
tion to the general public, its dissemination is a violation of privacy only 
upon publication. The significance of publication is that once published, 
Campbell has little choice but to make this information part of her self-
presentation, or to revise some element of her self-presentation to reflect 
or contest this. She cannot “save face” and carry on as if nothing hap-
pened.  
 There may of course be justifications for this violation of her privacy 
and, indeed, in this case all of the Law Lords agreed that the Daily Mirror 
was entitled to set the record straight regarding the fact that Campbell 
was addicted to drugs since she had publicly claimed that she was not. 
One could argue that if we decide to present some aspect of ourselves to a 
particular audience then that audience is entitled to “pry” in order to de-
termine if those aspects are in fact accurate. The point is that we can un-
derstand the nature of the privacy violation at issue without reference to 
a general idea of a “private” sphere distinct from the public, or ideas of 
confidentiality, or ideas of harm. 
 This analysis of privacy as protecting the conditions of self-
presentation can also show why there was a privacy violation at stake in 
the Hosking case and why the New Zealand Court of Appeal should not 
have so easily dismissed the idea of privacy in “public”. The capacity for 
self-presentation of children as young as the Hosking twins is, of course, 
limited. However, we can accept the parents’ presentation of them as a 
reasonable proxy. We can agree that in pushing the children in a stroller 
in public, the mother presents her children to the people who are in that 
public place. However, she does not necessarily choose the audience; be-
cause it is a public place, others are entitled to be physically present and 
their observation is incidental to this.124 Therefore, from this descriptive 
fact of being in “public” one cannot infer the normative implication that 
Mrs. Hosking would have chosen to present her children in this way to 
the additional and quite different audience of a particular publication who 
might view a photo of them. Because it forces a new audience upon her, it 
undermines her capacity for her own and her children’s self-presentation. 
Moreover, unlike the people she meets while in a public place, the audi-
ence of a particular publication lacks an immediate justification for their 
observation of her and her children. Given this, the approach of the Eng-
lish Court of Appeal in Murray—which on similar facts accepted that the 
child had a legally significant privacy interest—is much more defensi-
ble.125  
                                                  
124  Austin, supra note 41. 
125  See Murray, supra note 23. 
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 This is not to say that there are no compelling justifications for the 
dissemination of private information through “publication”. There may be 
many justifications for what would otherwise be privacy violations. In par-
ticular, it seems reasonably clear that if you have to interact with a per-
son in a particular context, you are entitled to information about the per-
son that is relevant to that interaction, even if that person would not wish 
you to have it. The demands of others can and do limit individual claims 
to control over self-presentation. We might therefore claim: we all have 
the ability to talk about other people behind their backs and to talk in 
front of their faces about things that are relevant to our relationship. Ob-
viously much more work would need to be done to fully delineate the rela-
tionship between freedom of expression and privacy understood in terms 
of self-presentation. Nonetheless, the brief account here suggests several 
possible conclusions regarding this relationship. First, freedom of expres-
sion does not obviously trump privacy and vice versa. Second, even 
though these rights might be in tension in particular factual circum-
stances, they are not in fundamental opposition: both freedom of expres-
sion and privacy understood in terms of one’s capacity for self-
presentation protect expressive activity. The “balancing” approach en-
dorsed by courts in both the United Kingdom and New Zealand is there-
fore more easily justified than that of the United States, where freedom of 
expression has essentially engulfed the tort of publication of private facts. 
 Even if “publication” is generally necessary, is it always necessary in 
order to find a violation of privacy? For example, it might be that your 
self-presentation is affected by the dissemination of private information 
even in the absence of publication if your reputation is altered to such an 
extent that people interact with you as if you are a different person from 
the “self” you present. You then have no capacity to present yourself as 
other than this person even though in some sense this gossip retains its 
behind-the-back quality. The difficulty for ascribing tort liability in such a 
situation would lie in identifying a wrongdoer rather than in identifying a 
wrong. That is, each individual who participates in the gossip does not 
violate privacy merely through the dissemination of “private” information 
although the cumulative effect of this might be to undermine one’s capac-
ity for self-presentation. Perhaps if the information is of such a nature 
that one could reasonably foresee such effects of further dissemination, 
then it is a privacy violation even without meeting the “publication” re-
quirement. The American tort of giving publicity to private facts does not 
foreclose this possibility.126 
                                                  
126  “It remains to be seen whether a disclosure not equivalent to the giving of publicity will 
be actionable when the obtaining of the information was not tortuous in character” (Re-
statement 2d § 652D, supra note 15). 
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 Privacy understood as a claim to protect the conditions for self-
presentation is therefore promising for a number of reasons. First, be-
cause it does not rely on what an audience does, we do not have to identify 
a threshold of harm or form of coercion in order to impose legal liability. 
Second, it provides a compelling justification for why legal liability should 
follow from the publication of what would otherwise be gossip. Third, it 
provides a plausible basis for asserting that freedom of expression needs 
to be balanced against the protection of one’s capacity for identity forma-
tion rather than engulfing it. Finally, this capacity is capable of being de-
fined—and much more needs to be done than is presented here—and 
therefore provides the basis for differentiating privacy violations from 
other types of legal wrongs in a manner that can potentially address con-
cerns regarding the vagueness of privacy claims. In this way it provides a 
promising approach to understanding the nature of the wrong at issue in 
privacy rights, and therefore a way of developing a privacy tort that re-
sponds to the justificatory dilemma without retreating to an overly nar-
row view of liability. 
Conclusion 
 Although there is an emerging consensus regarding the need for pri-
vate law protection for privacy, at least in the context of the publication of 
private facts, this paper has argued that the resulting jurisprudence ex-
hibits a number of important tensions. Many of these tensions revolve 
around the questions of whether harm is required to give rise to liability 
for infringement of privacy, whether “private” refers to a category distinct 
from “confidential”, and the question of the role played by freedom of ex-
pression. This paper has argued that the tensions in the case law are not 
best understood in terms of the privacy impulse that underpins this 
emerging consensus but rather the containment anxiety that motivates 
courts to seek strong limits upon the scope of protection provided. In turn, 
this containment anxiety is best explained through reference to the 
courts’ search for either the kind of harm or the kind of coercion that 
could justify the imposition of a legal obligation to respect another’s pri-
vacy. In this way, the privacy impulse surfacing in case law is undercut by 
a justificatory dilemma. 
 In response to this justificatory dilemma, I have argued that the right 
to privacy does not protect one against harm or coercion. Instead, it pro-
tects one’s identity where this is understood in terms of one’s capacity for 
self-presentation. Not only does this approach provide a compelling justi-
fication for the imposition of legal liability in contexts such as the publica-
tion of private facts cases, but it also provides a clear account of the na-
ture of the wrong at issue in such cases and so illuminates something im-
portant about the nature of privacy.  
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 Such an account could potentially help courts to understand the con-
nections between various types of privacy claims, providing more credence 
to the idea of a “high-level principle” of privacy that does in fact have an 
accessible conceptual core. Indeed, an account of privacy as protecting the 
conditions for self-presentation has the potential to unite the four 
branches of the American tort of invasion of privacy. Apart from the pub-
lication of private facts branch, the law also provides relief against false-
light advertising, misappropriation of name or likeness, and intrusions 
upon seclusion. Despite Prosser’s influential argument that these four 
branches in fact protect four separate interests, one could argue that the 
four branches in fact protect against four different kinds of violations of 
one’s capacity for self-presentation.127 For example, publishing an adver-
tisement that indicates an endorsement of a product puts words in the 
plaintiff’s mouth that he or she has not chosen. Surely this is the most ba-
sic sense in which one has a capacity for self-presentation—to choose 
what one wishes to express and to whom. This capacity is also under-
mined when another “appropriates” one’s identity and uses it without 
consent. Similarly, intrusions upon seclusion change the audience of one’s 
self-presentation against one’s wishes. Such an account might also pro-
vide the basis upon which to relate the tort of invasion of privacy to statu-
tory “privacy” regimes modelled upon fair information practices and 
which generally provide individuals with rights relating to the collection, 
use, and disclosure of their personal information—a set of interests that 
commentators increasingly discuss in terms of protecting an individual’s 
“digital persona”.128 
 An understanding of privacy in terms of the protection of the condi-
tions for self-presentation, and its relationship with various types of legal 
regimes purporting to protect privacy, obviously requires much more 
elaboration. However, the claim here is that such an account not only is 
compatible with liberal justifications for legal rights, but also may help us 
understand a wide range of privacy claims in a manner that is difficult if 
we remain focused on definitional difficulties, or traditional analyses of 
harm or coercion. In this way, examining what I have been calling the 
justificatory dilemma provides not just a more compelling analysis of the 
containment anxiety present in the cases, but also a shape to the privacy 
impulse that is emerging. 
    
                                                  
127  Prosser, supra note14. 
128  See e.g. Clarke, supra note 6; Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Pri-
vacy in the Information Age (New York: New York University Press, 2004). 
